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Abstract
Language provides simple ways of communicating generalizable knowledge to each other
(e.g., “Birds fly”, “John hikes”, “Fire makes smoke”). Though found in every language and
emerging early in development, the language of generalization is philosphically puzzling and
has resisted precise formalization. Here, we propose the first formal account of
generalizations conveyed with language that makes quantitative predictions about human
understanding. We test our model in three diverse domains: generalizations about categories
(generic language), events (habitual language), and causes (causal language). The model
explains the gradience in human endorsement through the interplay between a simple
truth-conditional semantic theory and diverse beliefs about properties, formalized in a
probabilistic model of language understanding. This work opens the door to understanding
precisely how abstract knowledge is learned from language.
Keywords: genericity, generalization, generics, pragmatics, semantics, Bayesian
modeling
Word count: 27578
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The Language of Generalization
Introduction
Knowledge that extends beyond the present context is crucial to thrive in our
open-ended, dynamic world. Yet such knowledge can be difficult to extract from the
environment: The relevant observations may be costly (e.g., learning that a plant is
poisonous) or rare (e.g., understanding that lightning strikes tall objects). Fortunately, we
are not limited to acquiring generalizations on our own; language allow us to communicate
generalizations to each other. By sharing generalizable knowledge, we flourish collectively
without individually needing to taste potentially-poisonous plants or personally witness
lightning strikes. Being able to flexibly communicate generalizations from one generation to
the next supports the faithful transmission of knowledge necessary for culture to
cumulatively evolve (Henrich, 2015; Tomasello, 1999).
The language of generalization covers a diverse swath of natural language expressions.
Generic language conveys generalizations about categories (e.g., “Dogs have four legs”;
Carlson, 1977; Cohen, 1999; Leslie, 2007; Nickel, 2008) and is the most well-studied case of
generalizations in language.1 In contrast to statements about concrete individuals (e.g.,
“Rufus has four legs”), generic statements refer to inherently unobservable categories (e.g.,
the category of dog) and convey information that extends beyond the present context, a
fact which children as young as 2 appreciate (Cimpian & Markman, 2008). Simple events
(e.g., “John ran yesterday”) can be generalized into habitual sentences (e.g., “John runs”),
and even events of complex inferential types such as actual causal events (e.g., “The fire
caused the smoke”) can be described in generalization (e.g., “Fire causes smoke”).
1Some writers refer to the all of the language of generalization as “generic language” or generics. In both
the empirical and theoretical literatures, however, analysis and experiments often focus only on generalizations
about categories. We use the more narrow-scoped terms (e.g., generics, habituals, and causals) to highlight
the diversity of semantic types being predicated.
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Understanding the language of generalization is a project with far-reaching
implications. The language of generalization is ubiquitous in everyday conversation, is found
in every language (Behrens, 2005; Carlson & Pelletier, 1995), and conveys rich meanings,
impacting motivation (Cimpian, Arce, Dweck, & Markman, 2007), transmitting stereotyped
beliefs about social categories (Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012), and making meaning from
experience (Orvell, Kross, & Gelman, 2017). It is highly-prevalent in child-directed speech
(Gelman, Goetz, Sarnecka, & Flukes, 2008) and its ability to refer to abstractions beyond the
present context suggests its centrality to the growth of conceptual knowledge (Gelman, 2004).
Despite its ability to convey abstract knowledge, its ubiquity in discourse, and its
relative morphosyntactic simplicity, the language of generalization displays subtle
context-sensitivities that make it difficult to formalize. “Robins lay eggs” sounds true and
“Robins are female” does not. Yet in each case, only 50% of the category has the property
(i.e., only the females lay eggs). “Mosquitos carry malaria” sounds true despite malaria being
present in only a tiny fraction of mosquitos. Even more perplexing: “Supreme Court Justices
have even social security numbers” is thought to be intuitively a false generalization even if
it were the case that on the current bench, nine out of nine justices had even social securtity
numbers (i.e., when the sentence “All Supreme Court Justices have even social security
numbers” is true; Cohen, 1999). Similar context-sensitivity can be observed with habituals:
“Mary climbs mountains” could imply a few mountain climbs a year for Mary, but “John
runs” would be infelicitious if John went for a run three times last year.
These observations have led some to conclude that the literal meaning of a generic
statement (and by analogy, other generalizations in language) involves more than just the
number of members of the category who have the property, otherwise known as the
prevalence of the feature in the category. Instead, theorists have argued that generics are not
treatable by the standard tools of truth-functional semantics (Montague, 1973), but rather
should be thought of semantically as a direct, linguistic manifestation of abstract relations
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between kinds and properties (Leslie, 2008; Prasada, 2000; Prasada, Hennefield, & Otap,
2012). For example, the statements “Bishops move diagonally” or “The Speaker of the House
succeeds the Vice President” are true not because of a tendency on behalf of instances of a
category to actually uphold the property, but rather the existence of a conceptual
relationship (e.g., what it means, in the game of chess, to be a bishop). True generics can be
supported by different underlying types of category–property relations (e.g., principled
vs. statistical connections; Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), and thus support qualitatively
different inferences (e.g., “Being striped is one aspect of being a tiger” is generally endorsed,
while “Carrying malaria is one aspect of being a mosquito” is not, even while “Tigers are
striped” and “Mosquitos carry malaria” are both intuitively true; Prasada, Khemlani, Leslie,
& Glucksberg, 2013). This conceptual view of generics has been influential in psychology,
because it predicts qualitative differences between different kinds of generics.
Insofar as there is a single class of linguistic expressions that convey generalization,
however, there should be something common to them all: a literal meaning that unifies
generic, habitual, and causal language. In this paper, we propose such a semantic core based
on prevalence and formalized using the tools of truth-functional semantics (Cohen, 1999;
Montague, 1973). A semantics based on prevalence will not be enough to capture subtle
sensitivities to context that the language of generalization exhibit. We propose that the
meaning of generalizations is underspecified or vague, and that listeners derive a more
precise interpretation in context using probabilistic world knowledge.
The fact that generics are vague does not preclude them from being treated with
formal models. We draw upon the tools of Bayesian models of cognition (Tenenbaum, Kemp,
Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011) to formalize the vagueness and context-dependence of generic
language (Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Lassiter, 2015). The Bayesian model
separates the semantics of an utterance conveying a generalization from the world knowledge
a listener would use to interpret the utterance, a key theoretical advancement beyond
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previous accounts. This formal model is the first of its kind to make quantitative predictions
about human understanding of the l anguage of generalization.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe our computational
framework for interpreting generalizations and our precise model for endorsing such
statements (i.e., a model of truth judgments). To illustrate how the model works, we then
work through a number of standard examples from the linguistics literature that any model
of generics should be able to accomodate. The third section discusses the relationship of our
model to previous accounts of generics from the linguistics and philosophical literatures.
These theoretical sections are followed by three empirical case studies: generalizations about
categories (generic language), events (habitual language), and causes (causal language). In
the case study of generics, we use measure relevant background knowledge and prevalence to
predict endorsements of familiar generic statements (e.g., “Robins lay eggs”). In the study of
habituals, we measure background knowledge but manipulate the prevalence or frequency of
the event to predict endorsements of habitual statements about novel agents (e.g., “John
runs” given that he’s run a certain number of times in the past). In this case study, we also
further examine the nature of the relevant probabilities for endorsing generalizations, asking
whether it matters how often John has run in the past (past frequency) or how often a
speaker expects him to run in the future (predictive probability). Finally, in our last case
study, we manipulate background knowledge to show its causal influence on endorsing
generalizations about novel causal events (e.g., “Herb X makes wugs sleepy”). We compare
our model to two previously articulated quantitative models of generics as well as a
lesioned-version of our model. In all cases, we find a very strong agreement of our model’s
predictions to human elicited endorsements, where the simpler models fall short. We
conclude our paper by clarifying some of the theoretical claims of the model and discuss
open-questions for this approach.
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Computational Framework
Generalizations are used to make predictions about events or properties of instances
that an agent has yet to experience (Hume, 1888). People readily predict that the next dog
they encounter will have four legs, drinking another cup of coffee will cause jitters, and a new
day will find the people that we know doing what they habitually do. In each case, we assign
a specific exemplar x to a category k, and make a prediction that it will have feature f . This
prediction can be described by a conditional probability: P (x ∈ f | x ∈ k), the probability
that x will have f given that it is in k (formally, an instance of k will be in the set of things
that have f), which we will refer to as the prevalence and for convenience write as
p = P (f | k). The prevalence p is a prevalence in the mind, a latent belief that a future
instance of a category would have a particular property; others might call this projectibility
(Goodman, 1955). The targets of our predictions can vary widely: They may be objects (a
dog), events (an instance of coffee-drinking), or more ad-hoc types (a person on a particular
day). The properties also may vary (e.g., having fur, causing jitters, going to the gym). Yet
the mathematical description of the inductive belief is always given by a probability P (f | k).
Probability is a useful representation for human generalization from observations
(Shepard, 1987). If you observe several wugs (a novel category) that have two legs, you might
infer that all wugs have two legs. But not all properties have such strong projectibility:
Seeing a wug with broken wings tells you comparatively less about other wugs having broken
wings (Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, & Kunda, 1983). Abstract, potentially domain-specific,
beliefs about the projectibility of different properties can be represented by a probability
distribution over the prevalence P (p) (Kemp, Perfors, & Tenenbaum, 2007). By assuming
some generative process that could produce one’s observations o—a likelihood function
P (o | p)—Bayes’ Theorem provides the mathematically correct way to update one’s prior
beliefs from observations: P (p | o) ∝ P (o | p) · P (p) (Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001).
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Observational data is not always available, however. Instead, we must listen to others
to learn about properties that are costly to observe (e.g., staring at the sun makes you go
blind), events that are statistically unlikely (e.g., lightning strikes tall objects), or any aspect
of the world that we have yet to experience. Fortunately, language provides simple ways of
communicating generalizations.
Communicating generalizations
The language of generalization is easy to spot when a property, that could apply to an
individual, is predicated of a category (e.g., “Dogs have four legs”: has four legs could apply
to an individual as in “Rufus has four legs”). In the semantics literature on generics, bare
plural sentences of this kind are sometimes described as characterizing sentences in contrast
with kind-denoting sentences where the property can only meaningfully apply to the category
as a whole (e.g., “Dinosaurs are extinct”; extinct cannot apply to an individual dinosaur).
Generalization can also manifest when describing instances of an individual (habitual
language; e.g., “John smokes”; Carlson, 1977, 2005); in this case, the particular instance
being generalized is an instance of an individual (e.g., John at a particular moment in time),
which also permits predication (e.g., “John smoked yesterday after dinner”). Verbs like
causes or makes also seem to convey generalization, in this case, about an instance of an
actual causal event (causal language; e.g., “Fire causes smoke”). Psychologists, linguists, and
philosophers have long studied the language of generalization, as it appears very simple (e.g.,
syntactically) yet its meaning is difficult to formalize.2
The basic intuition behind our account is that before a listener hears a novel
2We further distinguish the problem of formalizing a meaning for the language of generalization from the
problem of identifying generalizations. Syntax alone is neither necessary nor sufficient for a listener to know
that the sentence conveys a generalization (e.g., indefinite singulars can encode generalizations: “A dog has
four legs” and bare plurals may not: “Dogs are on my front lawn”). Our analysis thus begins once a sentence
has been disambiguated as conveying a generalization.
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generalization such as “Alligators grow to be 10-feet long”, they do not know how widely
distributed the property to be in the category, including whether or not it is present at all.
The utterance provides a vague sense of how strongly the generalization applies (e.g., how
many alligators grow to be 10-feet long), which the listener derives from their knowledge of
how the property (growing to be 10-feet long) is distributed among other categories (e.g.,
other animals). The decision of whether or not to endorse the generalization is that of a
speaker reasoning about how well the utterance would align their interlocutor’s beliefs about
the prevalence of the feature in the category with those of their own. We formalize this
intuition in a truth-conditional semantics incorporated into a Bayesian model of belief
updating.
Interpretation model. Our model of interpreting the language of generalizations
has three conceptual components: Probability, vagueness, and context. If generalization from
observations can be described by a probability p, it is natural to posit that same construct
will be at the heart of a semantic theory of the language of generalization (Ingredient 1:
Probability). In semantics, belief updating generally passes through Boolean truth values
(Montague, 1973). The simplest way to derive a Boolean from a scalar quantity like
probability is via a threshold semantics: The utterance is true if the relevant scalar value is
above a threshold. For example, the literal meaning of the sentence “Some dogs have four
legs” is that there is a non-zero chance that a given dog will have four legs:
[[some]](p) := p > 0. “Most dogs have four legs” can also be described as a threshold on
prevalence (e.g., the chance that a dog will have four legs is greater than 50%):
[[most]](p) := p > 0.5.3 Thus, the simplest semantics for a generalization would also be a
threshold on the prevalence: [[gen]](p, θ) := p > θ.
The extreme flexibility of generalizations (e.g., “Mosquitos carry malaria”; “Birds lay
3These definitions concern the standard semantic truth conditions of quantifiers, not their pragmatic
interpretations (e.g., that “some” often implies “not all”).
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eggs” vs. “Birds are female”) suggests that no fixed threshold would suffice. Rather than
throw out the threshold-semantics, we posit that the threshold is underspecified in the literal
meaning and is contextually-determined in a way analogous to how gradable adjectives like
tall have contextually-determined thresholds (e.g., what counts as tall for a person is
different than what counts as tall for a building; Kennedy, 2007; Lassiter & Goodman, 2013).
We formalize this underspecification of meaning (Ingredient 2: Vagueness) by putting a
probability distribution over θ: P (θ) (Lassiter & Goodman, 2013, 2015; cf., Qing & Franke,
2014).
Finally, the meanings of linguistic expressions manifest in their capacity to convey
information from speaker to hearer (Clark, 1996; Grice, 1975; Levinson, 1995). Thus, the
final ingredient to our model is context (Ingredient 3), which must be minimally formalized
as a listener’s prior knowledge about the property P (p) and which we describe in the Worked
Examples section below.
Putting these three ingredients (probability, vagueness, and context) together, we get
the following model of interpreting generalizations in language:
L(p, θ | u) ∝ δ [[u]](p,θ) · P (θ) · P (p) (1)
We denote this probabilistic interpretation model by L to indicate that it is modeling a
listener updating their beliefs according to the truth-functional meaning of an utterance u.
Formally, the truth-functional meaning is represented by the Kronecker delta function
δ [[u]](p,θ) that returns 1 when the utterance is true (i.e., when p > θ) and 0 otherwise.
δ [[ugen]](p,θ) ∝

1 if p > θ
0 otherwise
(2)
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Following Lassiter and Goodman (2015), we formalize the vagueness in the meaning of
generalizations P (θ) as a uniform distribution over the support of P (p).
With these ingredients, the literal interpretation model (Eq. 1) computes a posterior
interpretation distribution on prevalence by considering different possible thresholds θ.
Figure 1 shows the model behavior assuming a uniform prevalence prior P (p), representing a
purely abstract property for which an interpreter has no substantive prior knowledge. If the
threshold were to be very high (e.g., θ = 0.75), only the highest prevalence levels would be
consistent with the utterance. As the threshold decreases, more and more prevalence levels
become compatible with the threshold (Figure 1A). The interpretation model weights the
different thresholds by the probability that each is true, resulting in a posterior
interpretation distribution that favors higher prevalence levels (Figure 1B). This
interpretation distribution captures the intuition that generalizations imply high prevalence,
though with substantial uncertainty about the precise quantity.
The model in Eq 1 describes a general mechanism of belief-updating via an uncertain
threshold semantics. The semantic scale is determined by the prevalence prior P (p). For
generalizations about categories (i.e., generic statements), P (p) ranges over [0, 1]; p denotes
the chance that an instance of a category has a Boolean property. To apply this same model
to generalizations about events (i.e., habituals like “John runs”), we use a different, but
related, scale: the frequency within a given time window (e.g., number of times John went
for a run in the past week).4 For events then, p is a rate and P (p) ranges over [0,∞).
Endorsement model. In this paper, we are interested in explaining truth
judgments (e.g., “Robins lay eggs” is intuitively true; “Robins are female” is not). We model
the endorsement task (e.g., true vs. false; agree vs. disagree) as a speaker decision about
whether or not to produce the generalization to a naive listener; thus, the endorsement
4This measure is closely related to the instantaneous probability density of the event, as the time window
gets infinitesimally small.
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model has two alternative utterances: produce the generalization vs. a null alternative
(Degen & Goodman, 2014; Franke, 2014). For simplicity, we take the null alternative to be
an informationless “silent” utterance which is always true: [[null]](p, θ) = True.5 This kind
of speaker model defined in terms of a listener model formalizes the basic aspects of
communicative reasoning and is the simplest instantiation of a Rational Speech Act model
(Frank & Goodman, 2012; Goodman & Frank, 2016).
The endorsement model (called S for speaker) decides whether or not to produce the
generalization by reasoning about how the listener model (L; Eq. 1) would interpret it:
S(u | p) ∝ (
∫
θ
L(p, θ | u) dθ)λ (3)
The goal of the endorsement model is to align the listener’s a priori beliefs about
prevalence (given by the prevalence prior) with the speaker’s beliefs about the prevalence of
the feature in the referent category p, the referent prevalence (e.g., that 50% of robins lay
eggs).6 The endorsement model makes an approximately rational (with degree of rationality
λ), information-theoretic decision based on its beliefs about which utterance would best
achieve the goal of conveying the referent prevalence p. The semantic threshold θ is
necessary for establishing the truth conditions and deriving an interpretation (used in Eq. 1)
but is otherwise a nuisance parameter, which the endorsement model integrates out (note
5The null alternative can be realized in at least two other ways: the negation of the generalization (e.g.,
“It is not the case that Robins lay eggs”) or the negative generalization (i.e., “Robins do not lay eggs”). All
results reported are similar for these two alternatives, and we use the alternative of the “silent” utterance for
simplicity.
6A more general version of this model can relax the assumption that the endorser / speaker has access to
a specific prevalence p that it wants to communicate. Rather, the endorser may have probabilistic beliefs
about the prevalence of the property for the referent category k, which would be represented by a distribution
over p: P (p | k). In this situation, we would define the endorsement model decision to be with respect to
the expected value of the informativity, which integrates over the endorsement model’s belief distribution:
S(u | k) ∝ exp (λ · Ep∼Pk ln
∫
θ
L(p, θ | u) dθ). For the empirical case studies described below, these two
versions of the model make almost identical predictions.
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that there is no θ in the left-hand side of Eq. 3). Given that the speaker only has two
options (i.e., produce the generalization utterance or stay silent), the endorsement decision
comes down to whether or not the referent prevalence is more likely under the prevalence
prior distribution P (p) (i.e., the listener’s posterior upon hearing silence) or the listener
generic interpretation distribution L(p | u) given by Eq. 1 (Figure 1C). In the next section,
we work through different examples from the linguistics literature, describing the prevalence
prior and other relevant model components for each.
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Figure 1 . Computational model behavior assuming a uniform prior over prevalence. A:
Interpretation model posteriors assuming different fixed thresholds (facets). High thresholds
rule out more world-states (prevalence levels), leaving fewer world-states among which to
distribute the full probability mass. B: Generic interpretation model averages over all
thresholds to return a posterior distribution that favors higher prevalence levels in a graded
manner. C: Endorsement model predicts higher rates of endorsemens as prevalence levels
increase.
Worked examples
We explore the predictions of the endorsement model in the context of a few worked
examples. These examples are taken from the linguistics literature on generics and are
statements that have been historically challenging for prevalence-based approaches (see
Table 1). We implemented these and all subsequent Bayesian models in the probabilistic
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dogs kangaroos sharks robins robins mosquitos
bark have spots don't eat people lay eggs are female carry malaria
Prevalence priors
Interpretation posteriors
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0
1
0
1
Prevalence
N
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e
d 
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ob
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y 
de
ns
ity
0.88 0.02 0.41 0.95 0.5 0.97 Endorsement Prediction
Figure 2 . Model simulations assuming different prevalence priors. Top: Prevalence priors
for six example features. Shapes of the priors were chosen to intuitively correspond to
the properties labeling the distributions. Arrows show referent-prevalence for a target
category. Bottom: Interpretation model posterior distributions over prevalence upon hearing
a generalization about a novel category. Numbers at bottom correspond to endorsement
model predictions for endorsing the generalization for the referent-category whose prevalence
is shown in the top facets (e.g., "Mosquitos carry malaria").
programming language WebPPL (Goodman & Stuhlmüller, 2014). All models, analyses,
data and links to experiments used in this paper can be found at
https://github.com/mhtess/genlang-paper.
Endorsement predictions depend upon the uncertain threshold model’s interpretations,
which are highly sensitive to the interpretation model’s background knowledge. Background
knowledge may be richly structured, reflecting intuitive theories about the underlying causes
of different kinds of properties (cf., Leslie, 2007). Our model posits, however, that the only
impact of structured knowledge on truth judgments is in their implications for beliefs about
prevalence, formalized in terms of a prevalence prior P (p). The prevalence prior reflects a
listener’s beliefs about the prevalence of the feature in an unknown or unfamiliar category
and be conceptualized in a theory-neutral way as a distribution over the prevalence among
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alternative categories (Figure 2).7 For example, the lay eggs prevalence prior should be
bimodal, with substantial probability mass near 0-prevalence (since many animal categories
do not have egg-layers) and a secondary component peaked around 50% (because among the
animals with egg-layers, only the female members of the category have the property).
Conversely, the distribution over the prevalence of being female is unimodal and centered at
50%-prevalence, because almost all animals have female members in that proportion.
Figure 2 (row 1) shows these and other intuitive prevalence priors for different properties (we
introduce methods for empirically eliciting these priors in the experimental section). We now
turn our attention to the endorsement model’s predictions.
Example Intuitive referent
prevalence
Intuitive
truth value
Issue
1. Dogs bark 95% True Not all dogs bark
2. Kangaroos have spots 5% False Some kangaroos could have spots
3. Robins lay eggs 50% True Only female robins (50%) lay eggs
4. Robins are female 50% False Same number that lay eggs (50%)
5. Mosquitos carry malaria 5% True Very few mosquitos actually carry
malaria
6. Sharks don’t eat people 95% False Most sharks don’t eat people
7. Mary handles the mail from
Antarcita
0 times True Consider there has never been any
mail from Antarcita
8. Supreme Court Justices have
even social security numbers
100% False Consider 100% have even social se-
curity numbers
9. Elephants live in Africa and Asia 50%/50% True Impossible for most to live in Africa
and most to live in Asia, and no indi-
vidual elephant lives in both Africa
and Asia
Table 1
Example sentences that a theory of the language of generalizations should correctly predict.
See details of each example in corresponding section.
7Alternatively, the prevalence prior can be conceptualized as a marginal distribution on prevalence derived
from an intuitive theory formalized in a probabilistic language of thought (e.g., Goodman et al., 2015).
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1. Dogs bark.
Often the first observation with generics is that they appear to behave like universal
quantifiers (e.g., “All”) that permit exceptions: Not all dogs bark, but still “Dogs bark” is
true. The uncertain threshold account immediately accomodates this example because there
is no single, fixed threshold beyond which a generic statement becomes true. Rather,
listeners have uncertainty about the threshold which leads to graded interpretations (e.g.,
“Dogs bark” means almost all dogs bark; Figure 2; column 1, row 2). The endorsement
model then predicts “Dogs bark” is a rather good generic sentence (Figure 2, bottom row)
even though there are exceptions to the universal generalization (referent prevalence of
barking among dogs roughly 95%, shown with arrow in Figure 2 row 2).
2. Kangaroos have spots.
A second observation regarding generics is that their truth conditions cannot be so
lenient so as to always convey existential quantification (e.g., “Some”). Indeed, it’s
intuitively plausible that some kangaroos do have spots but a rational language user might
feel awkward to assert the generic “Kangaroos have spots”. The model exhibits this same
restraint, predicting a very low endorsement probability for this generic sentence (Figure 2;
column 2). The reason is that, given the interpretation model’s background knowledge about
the property, the statement “Kangaroos have spots” will be interpreted like “Dogs bark”: it
would mean almost all kangaroos have spots. The endorsement model, which believes that
very few kangaroos have spots, then would rather not endorse the statement because it
would lead to a too-strong interpretation and mislead the listener.
3. and 4. Robins lay eggs vs. Robins are female
One of the most difficult examples for a theory of generics based on prevalence to
handle is the intuitive difference in truth value between the statements “Robins lay eggs”
and “Robins are female”. The former is intuitively true, even though only female robins
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could lay eggs (and hence, the prevalence is roughly 50%). However, the same implicit
restriction to only females does not seem occur for the latter statement, as “Robins are
female” strikes most as strange or false. Why is “Robins lay eggs” a reasonable utterance
while “Robins are female” is not?
The prior distributions over the prevalence of both features are shown in Figure 2
(columns 5 and 6). As described above, the priors are different: Many animals have zero
egg-layers (0% prevalence), while the vast majority of animal categories have female
members in exactly the same proportion (50%). Given this background knowledge, the
generic interpretation model returns roughly the same interpretation distribution for each
hypothetical utterance: In each case, the model believes roughly 50% have the property.
However, only in the case of “Robins lay eggs” does the endorsement model actually assert
the generic; it does so because the listener interpretation would be more aligned with the
referent prevalence in comparison to the interpretation of the null utterance, which is the
prevalence prior. In contrast, the hypothetical generic interpretation of “Robins are female”
is not different from the prevalence prior and hence the generic conveys no new information;
here, the generic would not be misleading but uninformative, and hence the model predicts
an endorsement probability of 0.5. Indeed, previous studies on generic endorsements have
found “Robins are female” to not be rated as completely false but rather receive an
intermediate endorsement level (i.e., neither true nor false; Prasada et al., 2013).
5. Mosquitos carry malaria.
The statement “Mosquitos carry malaria” is intuitively true in spite of the fact that
the vast majority of mosquitos are actually malaria-free. The prevalence prior for carries
malaria is highly skewed towards low prevalence levels: many animals do not have
malaria-carriers among them and even for those that do, the prevalence is expected to be
quite low. Then, carrying malaria is significantly more true of mosquitos than other animals,
an intuition that is often arrived at with this example. This kind of behavior is related to
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the construct of cue validity—the probability of the feature given the category e.g.,
P (isamosquito | carries malaria)—which we return to in the next section. The
uncertain-threshold model displays a critical behavior: It can endorse generics when the
referent prevalence is very low.
6. Sharks don’t eat people.
When the prevalence of the feature is very high, it is not necessary for the model to
endorse the generic. “Sharks don’t eat people” is predicted to be a somewhat strange
utterance, despite the fact that the vast majority of sharks do not eat people.8 Because for
almost all animal categories, the prevalence of not eating people is almost 100% (very few
things eat people), interpreting the statement “Sharks don’t eat people” would lead one to
believe that no sharks eat people (i.e., 100% don’t eat people), which is too strong. It is
interesting that because of the high referent prevalence, the model is less certain of its
decision, predicting an endorsement probability around 0.4 (i.e., somewhat false). We will
test this quantitative prediction in Experiment 1 on generic language.
7. Mary handles the mail from Antarctica (yet has never had the
opportunity).
Imagine there is a job in the local bureaucrat’s office to handle the mail from
Antarctica and this job is assigned to Mary; to date, however, nobody has ever sent mail to
the office from Antarctica (Cohen, 1999). In other words, the statement “Mary has handled
mail from Antarctica” is false. “Mary handles the mail from Antarctica”, however, is still
thought to be intuitively true despite zero actual instances of the event. This highlights an
important ambiguity in the theoretical commitments of the uncertain threshold model: The
8We create this example as the converse of the classic example “Sharks eat people”, predicted to be
true despite low prevalence (Leslie, 2007). We reverse this example to show how the model deals with a
high-prevalence feature for which the generic is predicted to be false or infelicitous.
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endorsement model aims to communicate some referent prevalence p, but does the prevalence
represent the actual, objective frequency in the world (e.g., the number of times in the past
that Mary has handled mail from Antarctica) or a subjective, predictive degree of belief in
the head (e.g., our prediction that were the appropriate situation to arise, Mary would be
handling the mail from Antarctica)?
We posit that Mary the Antarctic mail handler is an extreme case of generalizations
expressing predictive degrees of belief. We expect this context sets up the expectation that
any future mail coming from Antarctica will be handled by Mary. Thus the predictive
probability that Mary will handle Antarctic mail, should there be some, is high. Predictive
probabilities often track past frequency or actual prevalence in the world, but people’s
internal models of how the world works can lead the two to diverge. In this case our
understanding of Mary’s job leads to a strong predictive probability in the absence of past
frequency evidence. We explore this question experimentally in Exerpiment 2 on habituals.
8. Supreme Court Justices have even social security numbers.
Imagine that all current Supreme Court Justice has a social security number which was
an even number. “Supreme Court Justices have even social security numbers” is still
considered false, even though the property holds for exactly 100% of the category (Cohen,
1999). We predict the rejection of even social security numbered Justices is the result of
people’s intuitive theories guiding their subjective predictive probabilities, which feed into
the endorsement model. That is, we predict observers strongly believe there is no causal
relation between the evenness of one’s social security number and selection for the Supreme
Court, and thus would assign a roughly 50% subjective probability to the next justice having
an even social security number. Then, “Supreme Court Justices have even social security
numbers” would be rated by our model as similar to “Birds are female”, because all
professions have roughly the same probability of having employees with even social security
numbers. This example is thus the conceptual opposite of Mary the Antarctic mail handler,
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where our internal model of the world led us to a strong degree of belief in the property
holding in the future; with the Supreme Court Justices, our internal models lead to a
relatively weak degree of belief in the property holding in the future.
9. Elephants live in Africa and Asia.
Understanding how a semantic representation composes is another important test for a
theory of the language of generalization. Nickel (2008) suggests that “Elephants live in
Africa and Asia” is troubling for prevalence-based accounts (in particular,
majority-quantificational accouts where the generic means more than half ; Cohen, 1999)
because the statement should be semantically equivalent to “Elephants live in Africa and
elephants live in Asia”. It cannot be the case that most (more than half of) elephants live in
Africa and most (more than half of) elephants live in Asia, unless we are to posit
international elephants (i.e., individual elephants who live part-time in Africa and part-time
in Asia), which are intuitively implausible.
Our theory does not provide a fixed semantics for generics, but an uncertain one which
can be updated as more information comes in. In fact, with prior knowledge suggesting
against the existence of international elephants (Figure 3A), our model interprets “Elephants
live in Africa and Asia” as meaning that some elephants live in Africa and that different ones
live in Asia (Figure 3C). Of theoretical interest, an incremental parsing of the sentence (i.e.,
upon hearing only that “Elephants live in Africa”) leads our model to believe that most,
possibly all, elephants live in Africa (Figure 3B). When the sentence is completed (“. . . and
Asia”), the model non-monotonically updates its beliefs to something weaker: some
elephants live in Africa and others in Asia (Figure 3C). The flexibility of our model
accommodates new evidence that might otherwise contradict previous utterances because it
maintains uncertainty about the precise meaning of the utterance. From a compositional
perspective, this is highly desirable behavior but we leave the testing of quantitative
predictions of this kind for future work.
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Figure 3 . Model interpretation of a conjunctive generic ("Elephants live in Africa and Asia").
A: Intuitive priors for marginal distributions of prevalence for living in Africa and living in
Africa. B: Partial interpretation upon hearing utternace ("Elephants live in Africa..."). C:
Full interpretation upon hearing the end of the sentence ("Elephants live in Africa and Asia").
Uncertainty about the threshold for generic sentences allows the listener to non-monotonoically
update its beliefs about the prevalence of the feature in categories.
Relationship to other semantic theories
Our formal theory builds on and relates to a number of extant theories of generics in
both the formal semantics and psychological literatures. The dominant approaches from
formal semantics try to describe unified, objective criteria by which to establish if a generic
and other generalizations are true or false (i.e., generic truth conditions). These views are
typically statistical in nature in that they appeal to quantification or the statistics of the
world (e.g., how many of the kind have the property) to define those unified, objective
criteria. Many of these theories rely upon mechanisms outside of the truth conditions to
make sense of the extreme flexibility exhibited by generics; unfortunately, these
extra-semantic mechanisms are not described in sufficient detail to generate precise,
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quantitative predictions. Other theorists, primarily in philosophy and psychology, have taken
the extreme flexibility of generics to argue against a quantitative theory based on statistics,
instead suggesting that abstract, mental representations are directly tied to semantics of
generics (e.g., there is something about being a K which causes it to F). Statistical and
conceptual theories express the major contrasting views of generic language (Carlson, 1995).9
Conceptual accounts
Conceptual accounts try to identify the core meaning of a generalization directly with
aspects of conceptual structure. The most influential account in psychology comes from
Leslie (2008), which uses the same starting point as our analysis: Generics express
generalization. Leslie (2008)’s analysis draws upon insights from the psychological literature
on infant generalization to argue that generics tap into an innate, default mechanism that
signals the child (or adult) to generalize the property to the kind.
The default generalization mechanism has three components: the ability to (i) identify
whether or not a feature is a characteristic property of a kind (e.g., one characteristic
property for an animal would pertain to the mode of locomotion for the animal), (ii) identify
whether or not a feature is striking (e.g., can kill you; “Mosquitos carry the West Nile
Virus”), and (iii) segment counterinstances (instances of the kind which do not have the
feature) into positive and negative counterinstances (i.e., instances of the kind which have
some relevant alternative feature and instances of the kind which simply lack the feature,
respectively).10 On this account, generics are true if some instances of the kind have the
9We use the terms statistical and conceptual to refer to what Carlson (1995) referred to as “inductive”
and “rules and regulations” views, respectively.
10This positive vs. negative counterinstance distinction is a rather technical consideration (though not
without psychological foundation, see Leslie, 2008, p. 36) used to account for the difference between
examples like “Robins lay eggs” vs. “Robins are female”. For “Robins are female”, male robins are positive
counterinstances because they have an alternative property (being male). For “Robins lay eggs”, male robins
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feature when all counterinstances are negative counterinstances and the property is either
characteristic or striking. If the property is neither characteristic nor striking, then almost
all instances of the kind must have the feature for the generic to be true (e.g., “Barns are
red”). Many of the key factors in this conceptual approach are compatible with our view of
prevalence as a predictive probability: What is required is that the distinctions made by
conceptual accounts influence predictive probability, which mediates linguistic effects.
Indeed, one version of this mechanism is already suggested by Leslie (2008), citing findings
by Rothbart, Fulero, Jensen, Howard, and Birrell (1978), that a speaker’s perception of the
prevalence of the feature can be altered by virtue of its dangerousness or distinctiveness.
Default generalizations. The conceptual view of generics argues that it is not
desirable to define generics in the same terms as quantifiers (e.g., a truth-functional
threshold on prevalence), because generics are more basic or more fundamental than
quantifiers (Gelman, 2009; Leslie, 2008). For example, according to certain measurements,
young children have a nearly adult-like understanding of generics far earlier than they do
with quantified language (Gelman, Leslie, Was, & Koch, 2015). Similarly, adults who are
told novel information about categories using quantified language (e.g., “Most spiders shed
their skin”) and later asked to recall that same information will tend to recall quantified
information as generics (e.g., “Spiders shed their skin”), but not visa versa (Leslie & Gelman,
2012). As a result, generics are thought of as conveying default generalizations, whereas
quantified language expresses more sophisticated and specific generalizations. Rather than
be contradictory, our model can be seen as formalizing a default generalization as Bayesian
belief updating via a threshold function whose threshold value is contextually-informed by
are negative counterinstances because they simply lack the property (i.e., male robins do not reproduce by
some other method). We will not discuss this consideration any further other than to note that that the
difference between “Robins lay eggs” and “Robins are female” can be explained by a different mechanism
(e.g., informativity with respect to a prevalence prior). The notion that alternative features may come into
play in generic interpretation may also be addressed with prevalence priors constructed with respect to the
feature (described in the General Discussion).
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knowledge about properties. Alternative formulations of such a default generalization
mechanism could be proposed and quantitatively tested against our account.
Striking generics. Leslie (2008) posits a special mechanism to treat generics about
striking properties (e.g., “Rottweilers maul children”), which seem to be acceptable even
when the prevalence of the property is quite low (e.g., very few rottweilers maul children).
Indeed, Cimpian, Brandone, and Gelman (2010) found participants willing to endorse
generics about striking properties (e.g., “Lorches have dangerous feathers”) more so than
that of neutral properties (e.g., “Lorches have purple feathers”) at low levels of prevalence
(e.g., when only 30% of the category had the property). Leslie (2008)’s argument for
accepting striking generics is straightforward: These are relevant properties to know about if
you want to survive. Our theory posits two mechanisms by which striking properties could
influence generic endorsement: the prevalence prior and the referent prevalence.
The first observation is that striking properties are relatively rare in the environment:
Most animals do not maul children, eat swimmers, or carry malaria. Thus, the prevalence
prior distributions of these features may be hard to distinguish from properties that are just
generally rare and distinctive, as we have assumed in our worked example of “Mosquitos
carry malaria”. Cimpian et al. (2010)’s experiments did not measure the prevalence prior
distribution, but we have found in pilot work that the prevalence prior distribution changes
to resemble that of a distinctive property when participants are supplied information about
the dangerousness of a property.
The second mechanism by which strikingness could influence generic endorsement in
our model is by speakers having a distorted perspective of how prevalent these features are
within the referent category. That is, striking properties may be projected more strongly
(i.e., higher predictive probability that future instances will have the property) than neutral
properties.11 Interestingly, evidence suggests this enhanced projectibility holds for both
11This observation is also made by Leslie (2008) (p.42), who uses it as motivation for elevating striking
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dangerous properties (e.g., people doing criminal actions) as well as neutral, distinctive
properties (e.g., people taller than 6’5", Rothbart et al., 1978 Expts. 2 & 3). Thus, there is
evidence for the influence of strikingness on predictive probability, which we posit is an
intermediate representation between conceptual knowledge and generic endorsements. It is
beyond the scope of this paper to directly attempt to empirically distinguish these two
potential mechanisms, though our experiments use a number of striking properties for which
we measure the prevalence prior and referent prevalence.
Principled and statistical connections. Leslie (2008)’s construct of
characteristic properties is similar to Prasada and Dillingham (2006)’s notion of a k-property
(k for kind), a property that bears a principled connection to the kind. A property bears a
principled connection to the kind if a (generic) sentence that appeals to the kind to explain
the existence of the property makes sense (e.g., “Dogs, by virtue of being the kind of things
that they are, are four-legged”). When such sentences are not endorsed (e.g., “Barns, by
virtue of being the kind of things that they are, are red”) while the simple generic (e.g.,
“Barns are red”) is endorsed, then the property is thought to bear a statistical connection to
the kind (a so-called t-property, for emphasizing that it is the tokens having the property
which matters for generic endorsement). In addition to the difference in endorsements for by
virtue of statements, Prasada et al. (2013) showed that different kinds of generic statements
(e.g., striking properties, characteristic properties with low prevalence) support different
kinds of inferences (e.g., normative: “Dogs are supposed to have four legs”, aspect: “Having
four legs is one aspect of being a dog”). Additionally, there is some evidence that the impact
of principled connections on interpretations is separate from their influence on beliefs about
prevalence (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006).
Both Prasada and Dillingham (2006) and Leslie (2008) surmise that a property may
qualify as characteristic (or having a principled connection) if there exists an overhypothesis
properties to their special status in her theory.
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about that property for a relavant superordinate category (e.g., each kind of animal has a
means for self-locomotion; Goodman, 1955; Shipley, 1993). Overhypotheses are naturally
formalized as hierarchical Bayesian models, wherein a learner acquires knowledge at multiple
levels of abstraction (e.g., learning from the same event about a particular dog, dogs in
general, and animals in general; Kemp et al., 2007). These Bayesian heirarchical models
yield differences in predictive probability that are particularly robust. Integrating a
hierarchical model of kinds and properties with our model of generic language is a natural
direction to understanding the computational underpinnings of conceptual relations and
generics. Different conceptual structures may give rise to roughly the same distributions on
prevalence and thus have similar generic endorsement profiles according to our model. Yet
the inferences that can be drawn from hearing these generics may differ, depending on their
interactions with the putative hierarchical knowledge people bring to bear (a la the
differences observed for “prevalence-matched items” in Prasada & Dillingham, 2006).
Building hierarchical models of kinds and properties is a major undertaking in its own
regard, but our formalism provides a way of connecting such a model with generic language.
Statistical accounts
Relative and absolute generics. Our underspecified threshold model has clear
antecedents in other statistical accounts, most notably Cohen (1999)’s theory of generics as a
frequency adverb (e.g., “generally”). Cohen treats generics as a class comprising two
qualitatively different types: relative and absolute generics. Absolute generics use a fixed,
50% threshold on prevalence: p > 0.5. That is, if a particular instance is more likely than not
to have the feature, then an absolute generic is true. By contrast, relative generics are true
based on a comparison to an alternative set of kinds Alt(K), analogous to the categories
that comprise the prevalence prior (the so-called comparison class, which we discuss further
in the General Discussion). “Mosquitos carry malaria” is true because an arbitrary mosquito
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is more likely than an arbitrary member of an alternative kind to have the feature.
In our model, we treat all generics as relative. Attested differences in endorsement,
then, emerge through the interplay of prior knowledge with our uncertain semantics.12
Further, though Cohen’s theory is framed in terms of probabilities, it is a fully deterministic,
fixed-threshold account which only makes qualitative predictions about what is true and
what is false (i.e., it has a deterministic semantics). In contrast, we propose a fully
probabilistic semantics embedded within a Bayesian model that describes how context
resolves the uncertain threshold; our theory is a joint semantic–pragmatic theory.
Cohen’s and other statistical theories employ a mechanism (not currently required in
our account) known as domain restriction to explain the context-sensitivity of generics:
contextually restricting the entities that go into the computation of prevalence (i.e., which
robins do we look at to compute the probability of laying eggs among robins?). Cohen (1999)
posits that prevalence is calculated by only considering entities that could have some feature
in a contextually-specified alternative set of features Alt(F ). For example, the property lays
eggs induces a set of alternatives that are associated with modes of reproduction (e.g., gives
birth to live young, undergoes mitosis, . . . ). “Robins lay eggs” (an absolute generic for Cohen,
1999) is evaluated by only considering female members of kinds, because only female
members can plausibly satisfy one of the other reproductive property alternatives (i.e., the
alternative features in Alt(F )). The inferential machinery behind domain restriction —how
to determine Alt(F )—relies upon conceptual knowledge, but the details remain obscure
(Carlson, 1995).13 Our uncertain threshold model can be seen as one particular mechanism
by which the domain may be restricted: The structure of the prior distribution over the
prevalence of lays eggs is a reflection of an intuitive theory of reproduction (i.e., that only
12For a related theoretical argument against the “relative” / “absolute” distinction for gradable adjectives,
see Lassiter and Goodman (2015).
13However, see Cohen (2004) for a discussion of how his semantic constraints relate to different kinds of
generics and different kinds of conceptual representational frameworks used in cognitive science.
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females lay eggs) and the uncertain threshold model uses that background knowledge to
derive a property-specific interpretation. There may exist a refactorization of the uncertain
threshold model to a fixed threshold where the listener has uncertainty about the relevant
domain of restriction.
Generic as indexical. Sterken (2015) develops a novel analysis taking the
context-sensitivity of generics as primary. This analysis draws analogy to other, inherently
context-sensitive linguistic expressions: indexicals (e.g., “this” or “I”). Sterken (2015) uses
this analogy to motivate a context-sensitive quantificational force as well as mechanism of
domain-restriction (of the kind used by Cohen, 1999 and others). Our uncertain threshold
semantics can be seen be a particular formalization of Sterken (2015)’s context-sensitive
quantificational force. We have not had need for employing domain restriction on the
categories, though as noted above, it is a potential avenue for future development.
“Normal” accounts. A popular alternative view under the statistical banner draws
on the intuition that generics often express something normative in the world (Asher &
Morreau, 1995; Nickel, 2008, 2016; Pelletier & Asher, 1997). “Dogs have four legs” is then a
good generic not because all dogs have four legs (regrettably, all do not) but were the world
to function normally (e.g., dogs would not be involved in freak tractor accidents or be born
with strange genetic mutations), then all dogs would have four legs. The idea that our beliefs
about what is normal in the world influences our judgments about generalizations has
intuitive appeal for rejecting accidentally true generics (e.g., “Supreme Court justices have
even social security numbers”) and resisting stereotyped language (e.g., “Boys are good at
math”). Our theory does not directly formalize what is normal, though we argue that a
speaker’s beliefs about what is probable (which may relate to what is normal; see Icard,
Kominsky, & Knobe, 2017) plays a role in endorsing and interpreting generalizations.
Underquantification. A proposal similar to our account concerning
underspecification of generics has been made in the computational linguistics literature
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(so-called underquantification; Herbelot & Copestake, 2011). In their model, generics express
an explicit quantified relation, specifically either “Some”, “Most”, or “All”. This proposal is
used to construct a set of features that accurately predicts (relative to human judgments)
the quantified relationship expressed by the generic (analogous to a quantifier version of the
implied prevalence task used in Gelman & Raman, 2003; Cimpian et al., 2010). Our semantic
theory can be seen as a generalization of underquantification to a continuous interval of
possible meanings. This distinction is relevant for the acquisition of the language of
generalizations; we do not take as primary the quantified relations (e.g., “Some”, “All”).
Additionally, by using an underspecified threshold on a scale of probability, our formulation
naturally extends to other scales and other kinds of generalizations (e.g., habitual language),
where quantified relations like “Most” or “All” are not directly applicable.
Cue validity. By encoding knowledge about other categories, the prevalence prior
distributions in the uncertain threshold model are deeply connected to the construct of cue
validity, or the probability of the kind given the feature: P (x ∈ k | x ∈ f) (e.g., one’s
predictions about whether or not an entity is a mosquito, upon learning that it carries
malaria). Cue validity is believed to play a role in understanding generic language
(Khemlani, Leslie, & Glucksberg, 2012; Leslie, 2007; Prasada et al., 2013), but the details
remain underspecified. The strongest view of cue validity is that it operationalizes an
alternative hypothesis about the meaning of generic statements: “Mosquitos carry malaria”
means “It is mosquitos that carry malaria”. Indeed, empirically-elicited cue validity has been
shown to be highly correlated with endorsements of generics (Khemlani et al., 2012).
Cue validity is inverse prevalence; the two are related via Bayes’ Rule:
P (k | f) = P (f |k)·P (k)∑
k′∈K
P (f |k′)·P (k′) . Knowledge about other categories k
′ enters in the denominator to
compute cue validity for prevalence. Indeed this normalizing constant (the denominator) is
equal to the expected value (i.e., the mean) of the prevalence prior distribution: E[P (p)].
Thus cue validity comes from a point estimate of the prevalence prior distribution, and
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information about cue validity can be derived from the constructs posited in our model. We
return to the implications of this relationship in the General Discussion. For a more detailed,
mathematical derivation of the relationship between cue validity and prevalence priors, see
Appendix A.
Baseline models for quantitative comparisons
In our empirical studies below, we compare our model to three alternatives. These
alternative models do not represent any of the extant theories of generics described above; no
extant theory is sufficiently precise to yield quantitative predictions. Instead, these models
are designed to interrogate the theoretically-substantive components of our model. There are
three such components: (a) property knowledge in the form of a prior distribution over
prevalence P (p), (b) endorsement as a decision-theoretic process of uttering the
generalization vs. not uttering it, and (c) vagueness in the semantics of a generalization (i.e.,
an uncertain threshold). In our empirical studies, we compare the uncertain threshold model
to an alternative, lesioned model which lacks the vagueness in meaning, assigning a fixed
semantics to the generalization (i.e., analogous to a quantified statement) but which has the
same prevalence prior and the decision-theoretic architecture. There are no correspondingly
simple ways to lesion the other two components (property knowledge or speaker decision)
that still produces quantitative, context-sensitive predictions. Instead, we compare our
model to two regression models based on empirically elicited referent prevalence and cue
validity, which provides some interrogation of the necessity of property knowledge in the
form of a full distribution on prevalence. In addition to serving as alternatives, these baseline
regression models help us understand the statistical properties of our experimental materials
and provide a comparison to standard methods in the psychological literature on generics
(e.g., Khemlani et al., 2012).
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Interim summary and overview of experiments
We have introduced the first quantitative theory of the language of generalization, and
discussed the relationship of this account to extant theories of generics. Above, we presented
simulations showing how the model predicts endorsements for classically puzzling generic
statments. These predictions depended upon the background knowledge about the property
P (p) as well as the referent prevalence p believed to be true for the category. For each of
these we chose intuitive values for the parameters of the model (i.e., the prevalence priors
and referent prevalence levels). In what follows, we test this theory empirically for a wide
range of generalizations, including generalizations of different types (categories, events, and
causes). We do this by both measuring and manipulating background knowledge and
referent prevalence and predicting human endorsements of generalizations.
In Case Study 1, we examine generalizations about categories expressed in generic
language. We first measure endorsements for thirty generic statements about familiar
categories, revealing an entire continuum of endorsements (Expt. 1a). We then measure the
corresponding prevalence priors and referent prevalence using a prevalence prior elicitation
task (Expt. 1b). We compare the quantitative fits of our model to the three alternative
models described above. This Case Study is an empirical version of several of the worked
examples in the section above.
In Case Study 2, we examine generalizations about events expressed in habitual
language while manipulating the referent prevalence. We measure prevalence priors for
events of people doing various actions (e.g., people running, hiking, climbing mountains;
Expt. 2a). We then measure endorsements of habituals for statements about novel actors
(e.g., “John runs”) given referent prevalence information (e.g., “In the last two months, John
ran three times.”; Expt. 2b). Finally, we test whether referent prevalence in our model is
best thought of as a past frequency (e.g., the number of times John has run in the past) or a
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prediction about the future (e.g., the number of times a speaker expects John to run in the
future) by experimentally manipulating future predictions while keeping constant past
frequency (Expt. 2c). We answer this question by testing the quantitative fits of two
versions of our model: one in which the speaker is conveying past frequency and one in
which the speaker is conveying their predictions about the future.
Case Study 3 experimentally manipulates the prevalence prior in the domain of causal
language (e.g., “Herb X makes animals sleepy”). Expt. 3a measures the (manipulated)
prevalence prior, confirming that our manipulation influenced participants’ beliefs about the
prevalence of the feature across different categories. Expt. 3b measures the corresponding
influence on causal endorsement, finding an effect of the manipulated background knowledge
in the way predicted by the uncertain threshold model.
Case Study 1: Generic Language
Learning from generic language (i.e., generalizations about categories; e.g., “Dogs
bark.”) is believed to play a central role in concept and theory formation (e.g., Gelman,
2004), stereotype propagation (Rhodes et al., 2012), motivation (Cimpian et al., 2007), and
many other facets of everyday reasoning. In addition, generics have been the case study of
choice for the semantics of the language of generalization because of their tantalizing
similarity to quantified statements (e.g., “Most dogs bark”). However, intuitions and
empirical data argue that generics simply do not reduce to quantified statements in a simple
way (e.g., Khemlani et al., 2012; Cimpian et al., 2010; Prasada et al., 2013).
We first investigate how the uncertain threshold endorsement model predicts actual
human endorsements of generic statements. We measure endorsement for thirty generic
sentences that cover a range of conceptual distinctions previously discussed in the empirical
literature on generics (Prasada et al., 2013): characteristic features displayed by a majority
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(e.g., “Ducks have wings.”), characteristic features displayed by a minority (e.g., “Robins lay
eggs.”), features that are striking or dangerous (e.g. “Mosquitos carry malaria.”),
noncharacteristic features displayed by a minority (e.g., “Robins are female.”), and features
that are totally absent (e.g. “Lions lay eggs.”). We further craft sentences with the goal of
eliciting the full range of acceptability judgments (intuitively: true, false, and indeterminate)
for generics with properties of low, medium, and high referent-prevalence (Expt. 1a). We
examine generics about animal categories in order to reliably measure the prior belief
distribution over the prevalence of features P (p). The prevalence elicitation procedure (Expt.
1b) includes measurements of the referent-prevalence p for different categories (e.g.,
P (x lays eggs | x is a robin)), allowing us to generate predictions for the endorsement model
(Eq. 3) as well as for simpler, alternative models.
Experiment 1a: Generic endorsements
In this experiment, we elicit human endorsements for generic sentences taken from the
linguistic and psychological literatures (Prasada et al., 2013). The goal of this study is to
elicit high variability of endorsements for generic statements about animal categories.
Method.
Participants.
We recruited 100 participants over Amazon’s crowd-sourcing platform Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). Participants were restricted to those with US IP addresses and with at least a 95%
MTurk work approval rating (the same criteria apply to all experiments reported). Four
participants were excluded for failing to recall the button corresponding to agreement in the
forced-choice task. Five participants self-reported a native language other than English;
removing their data has no effect on the results reported. The experiment took about 3
minutes and participants were compensated $0.35.
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Procedure and materials.
Participants were shown thirty generic sentences in a randomized order. They were
asked to press one of two buttons (P or Q; randomized between-participants) to indicate
whether they agreed or disagreed with the sentence (see Figure 6A for the full list). The
thirty sentences covered a range of conceptual categories described above. Approximately
ten true, ten false, and ten uncertain a priori truth-value generics were selected. As an
attention check, participants were asked at the end of the trials which button corresponded
to “Agree”. Four participants were excluded for failing this trial.
Results. As a manipulation check, the first author assigned an a priori truth
judgment (true/false/indeterminate) to each stimulus item. As one would expect, there were
substantial differences in empirical endorsements: true generics were almost universally
endorsed (Maximum A-Posteriori estimate and 95% credible interval of endorsement
probability: 0.93 [0.91, 0.94]); indeterminate generics were endorsed at a rate less likely than
chance (0.38 [0.35, 0.42])) but substantially more than false generics (0.08 [0.06, 0.09])).
Ideally, a complete theory of genericity should be able to explain statements that are
endorsed completely, rejected completely, and the gradedness between the extremes. We
observe gradedness among our thirty examples covering a continuum of endorsement values
(Figure 6A). Such a continuum of judgments is already evidence against any theory that only
predicts categorically whether a generic statement is true or false. We next measure the
prevalence prior distributions and use them to articulate a set of quantitative models that
try to predict this quantitative variability in endorsements.
Experiment 1b: Prevalence prior elicitation
The prevalence prior P (p) in Eq. 1 describes the belief distribution on the probability
of a given feature (e.g., lays eggs) across relevant categories. To get an intuition for the
THE LANGUAGE OF GENERALIZATION 36
kind of knowledge encoded in this belief distribution, imagine you are walking outside and
come across an instance of your favorite kind of animal (e.g., a reindeer). What is the chance
it is female? Your answer will probably depend upon the percentage of the category that you
believe to be female (e.g., the percentage of female reindeer, approximately 50%). What is
the chance that it lay eggs? Again, this depends upon the percentage of the category that
you believe lays eggs, which then further depends on the particular kind of animal under
consideration: If you’re thinking of a reindeer, the answer is probably 0%; if you’re thinking
of a peregrine falcon, the probability is similar to the being female probability (50%) because
female peregrine falcons lay eggs. That is, the answer to how many of an arbitrary category
is likely to lay eggs is either roughly 50% or 0%, depending on the kind of creature you may
bring to mind.14
The thought experiment decomposes the prevalence prior P (p) into a prior distribution
on kinds P (k) and then a conditional probability of the prevalence given the kind P (p | k).
This decomposition can be used to measure the prevalence prior for familiar properties
P (p) =
∫
k P (p | k) dk as a stand-in for a richer intuitive theory that could give rise to
prevalence judgments. We measured prior distributions empirically for the set of properties
(e.g., lays eggs, carries malaria; 21 in total) used in our generic sentences in Expt. 1a. To
create a larger set of properties, we reverse-code responses for five properties to create their
corresponding negative properties (e.g., we create a property “doesn’t have beautiful
feathers” by subtracting from 100% the responses for “has beautiful feathers”).15
14The subjective probability may, in fact, be non-zero and small as opposed to 0. Non-zero probabilities
allow for the intuitive possibility of a reindeer that, by some terribly improbable set of circumstances such as
a genetic mutation, lays eggs.
15This reverse-coding assumes for these properties that logical negation tokenizes its own threshold instead of
being derived compositionally via bivalent logical negation. For related empirical and modeling investigations
regarding resolving compositional vs. non-compositional negation (in the context of gradable adjectives, e.g.,
“not happy” vs. “unhappy”), see Tessler and Franke (2018).
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Method.
Participants.
We recruited 60 participants over Amazon MTurk. Three participants were
accidentally allowed to complete the experiment for a second time, so we excluded their
second responses (resulting in n = 57). Two participants self-reported a native language
other than English; removing their data (n = 55) has no effect on the results reported. The
experiment took about 10 minutes and participants were compensated $1.00.
Procedure and materials.
On each trial of the experiment, participants filled out a table where each row was an
animal category and each column was a property (Figure 4). Participants first were shown
six animal categories randomly sampled from a set corresponding to referent-categories of
the generic sentences used in Expt. 1a (e.g., robins, mosquitos) and were asked to
generate five animal kinds of their own (Figure 4A). A column then appeared to the right of
the animal names with a property label in the column header (e.g., lays eggs). Participants
were asked to fill in each cell with the percentage of members of each of the species that had
the property (e.g., “50%”; Figure 4B). Eight property–columns in total appeared in the table.
This whole procedure was repeated two times (two trials). In total, each participant
generated ten animal names and reported on the prevalence of sixteen properties for
twenty-two animals (their own ten and the experimentally-supplied twelve).
Qualitative results. The elicited prior distributions have a diversity of shapes (8
examples shown in Figure 5A) that are qualitatively consistent with the schematic prior
distributions used in the Worked Examples section (Figure 2A). The property being female is
present in almost all categories in almost exactly the same proportion, whereas priors for
properties such as laying eggs or having spots exhibit more structure represented by the
multimodality of these distributions. Being red exists mostly at extremely low prevalence
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A B
Figure 4 . Prior elicitation task. A: Participants first generated animal names after seeing six
example categories. B: One feature at a time, participants estimated the percentage of the
category with the feature, for each category.
levels (i.e., 0 prevalence) but also at high prevalence levels (e.g., 50% or 100%), whereas
carrying malaria is really only present at low prevalence levels. This diversity is relevant
because our endorsement model makes different predictions depending on the shape of these
distrubutions.
Modeling the prevalence priors. In order to incorporate the uncertainty in our
measurement of the prevalence prior into the endorsement model’s predictions, we build a
Bayesian statistical model of the prior elicitation data. We approximate the prevalence
distribution for each property (e.g., lay eggs) with a Mixture of Betas model, which
assumes that the data generated for each kind comes from one of two underlying Beta
distributions.16 We specify one of these distributions a priori to represent kinds of animals
who do not have a stable causal mechanism that could give rise to the property (e.g., lions
and lay eggs), which results in prevalence or prevalence values close to or equal to 0. This
null distribution is potentially present for all features and acts in exactly the same way (i.e.,
16The Beta distribution is chosen because the support of this distribution is numerical values between 0 -
1, exactly the form of the response data in the prior elicitation task.
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the lack of producing the feature).17 The second distribution represents kinds of animals who
could have such a mechanism, and the two parameters of this distribution are not specified a
priori and are not the same for all properties, but are inferred on a property-wise basis from
participants’ responses. The Mixture of Betas distribution has a third free parameter (for
each property), the relative contribution of the null distribution (for example: we expect the
null distribution to not contribute at all to properties like being female, for which almost all
categories have at least some members with the property). To ensure the Mixture of Betas
model of the prior is not overly complex, we fit an additional model that represents only a
single underlying distribution (Single Beta) for a comparison. For more details about model
implementation and inference, see Appendix C.
The prior distributions over prevalence are well modeled as a mixture of two Beta
distributions and not as a single Beta distribution (Figure 5B; red vs. blue lines). The
Single Beta model provides a good fit for the being female distribution, but overly smooths
the other distributions, washing out the latent structure in participants’ responses. One
property that the mixture of Betas model does not perfectly capture is the prior distribution
over the feature lays eggs. The empirical distribution is tri-modal, with reliable modes at 0%,
50%, and 100%; a simple two-component mixture model has no way to account for such a
tri-modal distribution.18 A more complex model (i.e., one with three mixture components)
17This assumption is similar in spirit to that employed by Hurdle Models of epidemiological data, where
the observed count of zeros is often substantially greater than one would expect from standard models, such
as the Poisson (e.g., when modeling adverse reactions to vaccines; Rose, Martin, Wannemuehler, & Plikaytis,
2006)
18The third mode at 100% is not attributable to categories for which all members could be female (e.g.,
chickens). Instead, it appears that some participants are responding that 100% of several different kinds of
birds (e.g., robins) lay eggs. This may result from participants implicitly only considering female members of
the category as relevant to answer a question about a reproductive capactiy like lays eggs; this restriction of
what enters into the prevalence computation is known as domain restriction, is posited in several theories of
generics (e.g., Cohen, 1999), and has been observed in other prevalence elicitation tasks (e.g., Prasada et al.,
2013).
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would be necessary to perfectly account for this item. Using a three-component model for
this distribution does not change the resulting model predictions and we maintain the
simpler two-component mixture for uniformity.
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Figure 5 . A: Empirically elicited prior distributions over prevalence for eight properties. B:
Cumulative density plots reveal that a model of a mixture of two Beta distributions does
substantially better at capturing the structure of the priors than a single Beta distribution.
Distributions are the posterior predictive distributions for the models of the prior and the
raw empirical distribution. A completely uniform distribution would be represented as the y
= x line.
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Endorsement model comparison
We can now compute the predictions of our endorsement model. We describe first the
behavior of a set of alternatives models that have been previously proposed in the literature
and an alternative form of our proposed endorsement model before proceeding to the results
of the uncertain threshold endorsement model.
Baseline models. We present two baseline, quantitative models that have
previously been used in the empirical literature on generic language. In addition to serving
as alternatives, these regressions model help us understand the statistical properties of our
experimental items. First, we estimate how well referent prevalence itself predicts generic
endorsement (e.g., does the fraction of robins that lay eggs predict the felicity of “Robins lay
eggs”?). Second, we include cue validity—the probability of a kind given the feature—as a
second predictor in a linear model. We fit these models using standard maximum-likelihood
techniques and model uncertainty in the input measurements (i.e., referent prevalence, cue
validity) by bootstrapping those data.
Referent prevalence.
From the prevalence prior data (Expt. 1b), we estimate participants’ beliefs about the
referent prevalence (e.g., the percentage of robins that lay eggs) and use it to predict
endorsement. We find a little over half of the variance in the endorsement data is explained
this way (r2(30) = 0.51; MSE=0.08; Figure 5B upper-left facet). Referent prevalence alone
predicts a fair amount of variance because our stimulus set includes generics that are true
with high prevalence properties (e.g., “Leopards have spots.”) and false with low prevalence
properties (e.g., “Leopards have wings.”).
Large deviations from an account based purely on referent prevalence remain: Generics
in which the referent-category has intermediate prevalence (prevalence quartiles 2 and 3:
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16% < prevalence < 64%), are not at all explained by referent prevalence (r2Q2,3(15) = 0.01;
MSE = 0.14). This includes generics that are judged true with relatively low referent
prevalence (e.g., “Mosquitos carry malaria”) and false with relatively high referent
prevalence (e.g., “Sharks don’t eat people”).
Cue validity and referent prevalence.
Cue validity indexes the diagnosticity of the feature for a kind, given formally by the
probability of a kind given the feature P (k | f). As discussed in the Relationship to Other
Semantic Theories section above, cue validity is linearly related to expected value of the
prevalence prior distribution (see Appendix A for derivation). Cue validity thus acts using a
point estimate of the prevalence prior distribution, a single metric that summarizes the prior
distribution.
Though the cue validity of a property for a category can be derived from the
prevalence prior distribution, previous empirical studies of generics have estimated cue
validity from different empirical sources (Cree, McNorgan, & McRae, 2006; Khemlani et al.,
2012). In the empirical literature on generics, researchers often ask directly about the cue
validity probability (e.g., “There is an animal that lays eggs. What is the probability that it
is a robin?”; Khemlani et al., 2012), though in the broader literature on semantic memory a
free production paradigm is often employed (e.g., “X lays eggs. What do you think X is?”;
Cree et al., 2006). We found that these two ways of estimating cue validity diverge for a
number of key cases (Appendix B). Most notably, undiagnostic features (e.g., is female),
which in theory have a cue validity close to zero, were rated as having intermediate cue
validity (around 0.5) in the direct question paradigm, but not in the free production
paradigm. In response to a direct question such as “There is an animal that is female. What
is probability that it is a robin?”, participants seem to want to respond “I don’t know” by
placing the slider bar at the midpoint, rather than reporting their intuitive base rate that a
random animal would be a robin. The free production paradigm did not produce artifacts
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such as this one, and we chose to use it as the more veridical estimate of cue validity. For a
detailed analysis of the different cue validity measurements and comparison to cue validity
derived from the prevalence prior, see Appendix B.
A linear model that uses predictors for both referent-prevalence and cue validity does a
better job at explaining the endorsement data than just prevalence alone (r2(30) = 0.73;
MSE=0.04). This model is able to account for the endorsements of examples like “Mosquitos
carry malaria” (model endorsement and bootstrapped-95% confidence interval = 0.85 [0.72,
0.86]) and “Lions have manes” (0.79 [0.61, 0.84])), as these features are very diagnostic of
the kind (generic endorsement both > 0.9). Deviations, however, still remain. For example,
“Robins lay eggs” still receives only intermediate endorsement by this model (0.68 [0.56, 0.69];
human endorsement = 0.94 [0.87, 0.97]), and “Mosquitos don’t carry malaria” is misjudged
to be a pretty good statement (0.58 [0.41, 0.58]; human endorsement = 0.07 [0.04, 0.14]).
“Robins lay eggs” and “Mosquitos don’t carry malaria” highlight a shortcoming of
reducing structured prevalence prior distributions to single point-estimates of cue validity.
Lays eggs is a somewhat diagnostic feature for birds, but there are many kinds of birds, and
the feature is not itself diagnostic for a particular kind of bird like robins. Thus, the cue
validity is low even though robins are in the distinctive part of the lays eggs prevalence prior
distribution (Figure 2A bottom). Furthermore, cue validity cannot distinguish undiagnostic
features (features present in almost every category; e.g., not carrying malaria) from false
features (features that are absent a particular category; e.g., lions and lay eggs; see Appendix
B for more discussion of this distinction); the cue validity can be near-zero for different
reasons. Such a model makes the wrong prediction for non-distinctive properties with high
referent prevalence (e.g., “Mosquitos don’t carry malaria”).
Communicative endorsement models. Our underspecified-threshold model
considers how well the generalization would bring a naive interpreter’s prior distribution on
prevalence P (p) (Eq. 1; e.g., the prevalence of laying eggs among other animals) in line with
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the speaker’s belief about the referent prevalence (p in Eq. 3; e.g, the prevalence of laying
eggs among robins). As described in the Baseline Models for Quantitative Comparisons,
there are several substantive components to this hypothesis: (a) property knowledge in the
form of a prior distribution over prevalence P (p), (b) endorsement as a decision-theoretic
process of uttering the generalization vs. not uttering it, and (c) vagueness in the semantics
of a generalization. We construct an alternative, lesioned model by removing the vagueness
in meaning, assigning a fixed semantics to the generalization (i.e., analogous to the quantified
statements) but keeping the prior and the decision-theoretic architecture in place. There are
no correspondingly simple ways to lesion the other two components (context or speaker
decision) while still producing a model that makes quantitative, context-sensitive predictions.
For both the fixed-threshold and full uncertain-threshold endorsement models, we build
joint Bayesian data analysis models of the referent prevalence p, prevalence priors P (p)
(both from Expt. 1b data), and the endorsement data (Expt. 1a). Predicting the data from
both Expt. 1a and 1b by a single, joint-inference model makes our assumptions explicit
about how these data were generated and is the proper way to represent the uncertainty in
our measurement of the prior elicitation data (see Appendix C and Figure 13 for further
model specification details). Empirically elicited referent prevalence and prevalence prior
data (Expt. 1b) directly constrain the parameters that generate those quantities in the
model (p in Eq. 3 and P (p) in Eq. 1, respectively). The prevalence prior P (p) is modeled as
a mixture of Betas, and referent prevalence is modeled by a single Beta distribution. The
endorsement data (Expt. 1a) is modeled by our endorsement model (Eq. 3), which has one
free parameter λ. To learn about the credible values of the parameters of the joint-inference
model and resulting model predictions, we ran an incrementalized version of MCMC
(Ritchie, Stuhlmüller, & Goodman, 2016) for 3 chains of 150,000 iterations, discarding the
first 50,000 for burn-in.
Lesioned model (no vagueness).
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For a strong alternative model, we lesion the uncertain threshold model so that it has a
fixed threshold θ. We test the strongest, possible fixed-threshold model by searching for the
best possible single threshold that fits the data. However, a fixed-threshold model will have
to accommodate responses that are literally inconsistent with the threshold (i.e., a
participant endorsing a generic when the referent prevalence is less than θ); we thus outfit
this model with an additional extrinsic noise parameter, to allow for random guessing. Thus,
the fixed-threshold alternative model claims that participants make an information-theoretic
decision, taking into account the interpreter’s prior distribution on prevalence P (p), using a
fixed-threshold semantics, where deviations from a pure information-theoretic decision are
accounted for by noise. This alternative model has 2 additional parameters to our uncertain
threshold model (the value of the fixed-threshold and the proportion of noise responses).
To evaluate the fixed-threshold model, we examine model predictions as well as the
posterior distribution over latent parameters of the model (referent prevalence, prevalence
priors, the optimality, fixed-threshold, and noise parameters) given the observed data. The
Maximum A-Posteriori value and 95% highest probability density interval for the inferred
(fixed) threshold and noise parameters are 0.34 [0.25, 0.37] and 0.20 [0.18, 0.22], respectively.
The inferred optimality parameter in Eq. 3 is 0.34 [0.25, 0.37]. Figure 6B (bottom right
subplot) shows the fixed-threshold model’s ability to predict the generic endorsement data
(r2(30) = 0.9329; MSE = 0.010964). Though the model is able to capture a lot of the
variance, it only makes three kinds of judgments: true, false, or neither, similar to purely
semantic accouts of generics. It treats “Tigers eat people” (0.90 [0.89, 0.91]) as good a
statement as “Peacocks have beautiful feathers” (0.90 [0.89, 0.91]), though participants give
a substantially weaker endorsement of the former (“Tigers eat people” = 0.69 [0.59, 0.77];
“Peacocks have beautiful feathers” = 0.99 [0.94, 1]). Similarly, “Lions lay eggs” (0.10 [0.09,
0.11]) is judged to be just as bad as “Mosquitos attack swimmers” (0.10 [0.09, 0.11]), though
participants rate the former as completely false (0.01 [0, 0.06]) while the latter is kind of true
(0.38 [0.28, 0.48]). The fixed-threshold alternative model is unable to make these fine-grained
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Lions lay eggs.
Tigers have pouches.
Leopards have wings.
Peacocks dont have beautiful feathers.
Kangaroos have spots.
Sharks have manes.
Ticks dont carry Lyme disease.
Robins carry malaria.
Mosquitos dont carry malaria.
Sharks lay eggs.
Leopards are juvenile.
Sharks dont attack swimmers.
Tigers dont eat people.
Sharks are white.
Mosquitos attack swimmers.
Robins are female.
Lions are male.
Tigers eat people.
Swans are full−grown.
Sharks attack swimmers.
Swans are white.
Lions have manes.
Robins lay eggs.
Ducks have wings.
Leopards have spots.
Kangaroos have pouches.
Ticks carry Lyme disease.
Mosquitos carry malaria.
Cardinals are red.
Peacocks have beautiful feathers.
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Figure 6 . Endorsing generalizations about categories. A: Human elicited endorsements for
thirty generic sentences reveal a continuum of endorsements. B: Model fits for the uncertain
semantics speaker model (upper right), a fixed semantics speaker model (lower right), and
regression models based on referent prevalence alone (upper left) and prevalence + cue
validity (lower left). C: Five example empirical prevalence priors, model-predicted generic
interpretations, and empirical referent prevalence (speaker belief) distributions..
distinctions because it uses the same semantic threshold in all contexts.
Uncertain threshold model.
Our underspecified threshold model is the same as the fixed-threshold model, except
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that rather than having a fixed θ for all contexts, the model infers property-specific θ’s. We
use the same Bayesian data analysis approach, dropping the additional parameters required
for the fixed-threshold model (the fixed-threshold and noise parameters). Thus, this model
has two fewer parameters than the fixed-threshold model above.
We first examine the posterior predictive distribution on the prevalence prior and
referent prevalence data to ensure that the joint-inference model does not distort these
parameters at the service of predicting the endorsement data (e.g., such a distortion could
manifest by the joint-inference model inferring that 100% of mosquitos carry malaria in order
to predict that “Mosquitos carry malaria” is a good utterance). This is an important step in
model validation because it tells whether the model’s predictions are derived from intuitively
plausible values of the parameters (e.g., that not all mosquitos carry malaria). Importantly,
the joint-inference model captures the prior elicitation data (e.g., the probability of carry
malaria among various species) and the referent prevalence data (e.g., the prevalence of
carrying malaria among mosquitos) as well as it did when we analyzed these data in isolation
(without conditioning on the endorsement data) (r2prevalence prior parameters(60) = 0.9997;
r2referent prevalence parameters(63) = 0.9989; see Appendix D, Figure 14). This result confirms that
the theoretically-interesting predictions of this model — predictions of generic endorsement —
are based on intuitively meaningful model components (i.e., the shapes of the prevalence
distributions). Finally, the inferred optimality parameter in the endorsement model (Eq. 3)
is 2.47 [2.18, 2.75], a range consistent with the literature on similar models.
As we see in Figure 6B (top right), the uncertain threshold endorsement model
explains nearly all of the variance in human endorsements (r2(30) = 0.9978; MSE =
0.00035185). Examining the relevant model components that give rise to these predictions
further reveals the intuition for why the model makes the predictions that it does (Figure
6C). Recall the endorsement model’s alternative utterance is a null or silent utterance and
thus, the prevalence prior distributions are exactly what the interpreter model would believe
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if the speaker does not produce the generic. The endorsement model then decides whether
maintaining the listener’s prior or updating it with the uncertain threshold semantics would
better get the listener to guess the correct prevalence for the category (correct in the mind of
the speaker). The model rates “Robins lay eggs” as a good utterance because the prevalence
posterior implied by the generalization is similar to the referent prevalence.19 On the other
hand, the hypothetical interpretation for “Robins are female” is almost indistinguishable
from the prevalence prior, because the prevalence prior has such low variance (almost all
animals have female members in exactly the same proportion); the endorsement model then
has no basis to prefer silence or the generic statement and the model predicts that the
utterance should be neither good nor bad—endorsement around 0.5—also approximately the
proportion of participants who endorse the statement. “Mosquitos carry malaria” is an
interesting case because the prevalence prior has high variance (i.e., participants are highly
uncertain about the prevalence of carrying malaria among categories). As a result, the
generic interpretation also has high variance; still, the generic interpretation is more
consistent with the referent prevalence than the prevalence prior, and the endorsement model
predicts “Mosquitos carry malaria” is a good utterance. Finally, an utterance with high
referent prevalence, such as “Tigers don’t eat people”, is predicted to have low endorsement
because the generic would be misleading; even if most tigers don’t eat people, saying “Tigers
don’t eat people” implies that all don’t eat people, which is too strong.
19We again note that the empirical prevalence prior for lays eggs is tri-model with peaks at 0%, 50%,
and 100%. As a result, the generic interpretation is bi-modal: the listener is led to believe either 50% or
100% of robins lay eggs. Interestingly, the endorsement model still makes the correct prediction because
the referent-prevalence for laying eggs among robins is also bi-modal (peaks at 50% and 100%). That is,
domain-restriction (resulting in a response of 100%) seemingly occurs for some participants for both the
prevalence prior and referent prevalence measurements, and this allows the model to predict correctly that
“Robins lay eggs” is a good generic utterance.
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Discussion
Generic language is the premier case study for generalizations in language. Generics
have been studied extensively in the cognitive and developmental psychological literatures
and have deep implications for wide ranging phenomena from stereotype propagation
(Rhodes et al., 2012) to motivation (Cimpian et al., 2007). Heretofore, no models have been
articulated with enough precision to make quantitative predictions about endorsement
decisions, deciding whether a statement is true or false. This empirical case study
demonstrates that a semantics based on the prevalence of the feature is tenable despite of
alleged counterexamples (e.g., “Robins lay eggs” vs. “Robins are female”). The key
theoretical insight is that the truth-functional semantics is underspecified, or vague, and
resolved in context by a process of probabilistic inference. Our model provides a clear
delineation of world knowledge (formalized as a prevalence prior) from the semantics of
generics. We return to this point, and its implications for theory-building, in the general
discussion.
In explaining the variable endorsements of generics, we related the referent prevalence
(e.g., the percentage of robins that lay eggs) and the prevalence prior (e.g., the prevalence of
laying eggs for different kinds of animals) to the endorsement of the generalization (e.g.,
“Robins lay eggs”) via an information-theoretic communicative model where the meaning of
a generic is simple but underspecified. In this case study, we used generic statements about
familiar animal categories, which has long been the cleanest domain for testing semantic
theories of generics by providing minimal comparison like “Robins lay eggs” vs. “Robins are
female”. However, modeling familiar category generics is a correlational analysis: The
relevant quantities in the model were measured rather than manipulated. We now seek to
demonstrate how these quantities are causally related to endorsement, by manipulating
referent prevalence (Case Study 2) and prevalence priors (Case Study 3). In addition, we
take this opportunity to highlight the generality of the theory, by performing these
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additional empirical tests in different domains for generalization: events and causes.
Case Study 2: Habitual Language
As with instances of categories, particular events like “Mary smoked yesterday” can be
generalized into habitual sentences: “Mary smokes”. It is believed that an analysis of generics
should lend itself naturally to be extended to an analysis of habituals (e.g., Carlson, 2005;
Leslie, 2008), but no such analysis or empirical data has directly connected the two. In our
second case study, we focus on habituals about people’s behaviors that take the form:
singular noun phrase + present tense simple verb phrase (e.g., “Mary smokes cigarettes”).
Learning about the behaviors of others is useful because they tell us about what that person
is like more generally (e.g., Repacholi & Gopnik, 1997; Seiver, Gopnik, & Goodman, 2013).
When children describe their lives to others, a surprisingly large amount of the language
produced concerns the actions of people close to them (e.g., “My brother works part-time at
the restaurant”; McGuire & McGuire, 1986).
To test the generality of our theory, we use the same computational model and follow
the same general experimental structure as in the first case study. We take the event
analogue of prevalence to be the rate with which the event occurs (e.g., how often Mary
smokes).20 We test the model by first measuring the prevalence (rate) prior distribution for
various actions (e.g., how often different people smoke cigarettes; Expt. 2A). We then
measure endorsements of habitual statements while manipulating the referent prevalence
(Expt. 2B), and use our computational model to predict habitual endorsements. By
describing novel characters to participants, we are able to directly the manipulate the
referent prevalence, which we were unable to do for familiar categories in Case Study 1.
Finally, if habituals (and generics) are truly language for conveying generalizations,
20Specifically, for the generalization “Mary smokes”, the instances being generalized are instances of Mary.
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they should reflect speakers’ expectations, not merely their observations. This intuition is
sometimes expressed as an intensional meaning component of generics (Dahl, 1975). For
example, imagine a very small town where by total coincidence, all residents chew sugarless
gum. Endorsing the sentence “Residents of this town chew sugarless gum” seems to commit
the speaker to believing that it is not sheer happenstance, but that there is some underlying
cause that supports the counterfactual implication that were a new person to become a
resident of the town, they too would likely chew sugarless gum.
Our computational model predicts endorsement rates given a referent prevalence p.
Using this model, we can ask quantitatively how well prevalence conveyed by a speaker
represents the actual, objective frequency in the world (e.g., the rate at which a person has
smoked cigarettes in the past) or a subjective, predictive belief in the head (e.g., the rate at
which a person is expected to smoke in the future)? Such a distinction would support the
intuitions about sugarless gum residents and could explain why “Supreme Court Justices
have even social security numbers” sounds strange even if nine out of the nine current
justices have even social security numbers (Cohen, 1999): Our predictions about the
evenness of the next justice’s social security number are driven by strong prior beliefs that
selection for the Supreme Court is uncorrelated from the numerical properties of one’s social
security number; the current observations are not enough in this case to sway those beliefs.
We examine this aspect of the theory by measuring endorsements of habituals when causal
forces intervene on the world (e.g., the person buys a pack of cigarettes; Expt. 2C) as well as
participants’ predictions about the likely frequency of the event in the future. We then
compare habitual endorsement models based on speakers aiming to convey the objective,
past frequency or their subjective, future expectation.
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Experiment 2A: Measuring the prevalence prior for events
In order to generate model predictions for habitual endorsements, we first elicit the
prior distributions over rates for different events. For language about the behaviors of people,
P (p) represents a language user’s background knowledge about the rates with which people
perform a behavior; this prior can be constructed as a distribution over different people, each
of whom do the behavior with a different rate. We designed our elicitation task to take
advantage of the mixture-model representation of the prevalence prior used in Case Study 1.
In particular, we assume, to a first approximation, that the distribution over prevalence can
be represented as a mixture of those who tend to perform the action with a stable rate and
those who do not perform the action. With the further assumption that, all else being equal,
past is predictive of future behavior, we operationalize these two kinds of people as people
who have done the action before and people who have not the action before. We design this
experiment to measure participants’ beliefs about the relative proportion of these two kinds
of people (as a measure of the mixture parameter in the prevalence prior model) as well as
the rate at which people (who have done the action before) do the action. We will assume
for simplicity that people who have never done the action before will probably never do the
action.21
Method.
Participants.
We recruited 40 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were
restricted to those with U.S. IP addresses and who had at least a 95% work approval rating.
21It is likely that more than just these two possibilities are represented in people’s intuitive theories,
corresponding to individuals with additional traits or demographics, and influenced by the types of people a
speaker knows and interacts with. We assume here a simple two-component structure so as to not make the
specification of the prior overly complex.
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The experiment took on average 12 minutes and participants were compensated $1.25 for
their work.
Materials.
To construct our stimulus set, we choose actions from five categories of typical human
behaviors having to do with food and drug, work, clothing, entertainment, and hobbies. For
each category, we created pairs or triplets of events that shared a superordinate action (e.g.
writing poems vs. novels). The events were chosen to intuitively cover a range of likely
frequencies. In total, thirty-one events were used. For a full list of the stimuli used in Expts.
2A-C, see Appendix D.
Procedure.
For each event, participants were asked two questions, with different dependent
measures. These questions were designed to measure the two components of the prevalence
prior distribution. We anticipated there to be different beliefs about the rates and relative
proportions of men vs. women, so we asked about both genders separately. The two
questions were schematically:
1. “How many {men, women} have done action before?”
Participants responded “N out of every J.” by entering a number for N and choosing J
from a drop-down menu (options: {1000 - 10 million}, incremented by 10x; default
setting: 1000).
2. “For a typical {man, woman} who has done action before, how frequently does he or
she do action?”
Participants responded “M times in K.” by entering a number for M and choosing K
from a drop-down menu (options: {week, month, year, 5 years}; default setting: year).
For example, one set of prompts read: “How many women have smoked cigarettes
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before?”; “For a typical woman who has smoked cigarettes before, how frequently does she
smoke cigarettes?” Participants answered both questions for both genders on each slide (4
questions total per slide, order of male / female randomized between-subjects), and every
participant completed all 31 items in a randomized order. The difference in meaning of these
questions was explained to participants on an instructions page before the experimental
trials and tested for recall on a subsequent trial. Participants responded to this attention
check by selecting an option from a drop-down menu consisting of four options (one correct
description of the questions and three distractors).
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Figure 7 . Prevalence priors for events (Expt. 2a). A: Maximum A-Posteriori (MAP) estimates
of parameters of prevalence priors for the 31 items in Expt. 2. Items cover much of the
range of possible parameter values. B: Reconstructed prevalence priors. In order to show
frequencies for events that are very rare across people (e.g., "writes novels"), extremely low
frequencies (almost never) are omitted. Instead, height of the bars on left denote the MAP
values of the mixture component (in terms of proportion of people who have never done action
before), reflecting the (inverse) popularity of the event across people.
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Data analysis and results. All participants responded correctly to both questions
in the attention check trial, so all collected data were used in the analysis. Question 1 elicits
the proportion of people who have done an action before. We rescale this to be a number
between 0 and 1, and model it as generated from a Beta distribution: d1 ∼ Beta(γ, ξ).
Question 2 elicits the rate with which a person (who has done the action before) does the
action. We model this as generated by a log-normal distribution: ln d2 ∼ Gaussian(µ, σ).
Each item was modeled independently for each gender. We learned about the credible values
of the parameters by running MCMC for 100,000 iterations, discarding the first 50,000 for
burn-in.
The priors elicited cover a range of possible parameter values as intended (Figure 7A):
We observe a correlation in our items between the mean % of Americans who have done
action before (Question 1) and the mean log-frequency of action (Question 2)
(r1,2(62) = 0.73). Items in our data set that tend to be more popular actions also tend to be
more frequent actions (e.g., wears socks) and visa-versa (e.g., steals cars), though there are
notable exceptions (e.g., plays the banjo is not popular but done frequently when done at all,
as is smokes cigarettes; goes to the movies is a popular activity though not done particularly
often). This diversity is relevant because the speaker model (Eq. 3) will endorse habitual
sentences (e.g., Sam goes to the movies vs. the ballet.) contingent on these details of the
prior distribution.
To generate prevalence prior distributions, we built a Bayesian mixture-model for this
prior elicitation task, analogous to that used in Case Study 1 (Expt. 1A). The only
difference is that we estimate the mixture component φ directly from responses to Question
1. We assume that those who have not done the action before will probably not do the
action in the future. With these assumptions, the prevalence distribution is given by:
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φ ∼ Beta(γQ1, ξQ1)
ln p ∼

Gaussian(µQ2, σQ2) if Bernoulli(φ) = T
Delta(p = 0.01) if Bernoulli(φ) = F
(4)
Figure 7B shows example reconstructed priors. In addition to specifying the correct
way to combine our two prior-elicitation questions, using this inferred prior resolves two
technical difficulties. First, it smooths effects that are clearly results of the response format.
For example, a very common rating for certain events is 1 time per year. Presumably
participants would be just as happy reporting approximately 1 time per year (e.g., on
average, 1.2 times per year); the raw data does not reflect this due to demands of the
dependent measure. Second, this methodology better captures the tails of the prior
distribution (i.e., very frequent or very infrequent rates) which have relatively little data and
need to be regularized by the analysis. Now that we have modeled the prevalence prior data,
we see whether our endorsement model can accurately predict endorsement rates for habitual
sentences about these actions.
Experiment 2b: Habitual endorsements
In this experiment, we elicit human endorsements for generalizations about events
(habituals; e.g., “Mary smokes cigarettes”) while manipulating the frequency with which the
referent event occurs (e.g., how often Mary smokes cigarettes).
Method.
Participants.
We recruited 150 participants from MTurk. To arrive at this number, we performed a
Bayesian precision analysis to determine the minimum sample size necessary to reliably
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ensure 95% posterior credible intervals no larger than 0.3 for a parameter whose true value is
0.5 and for which the data is a 2-alternative forced choice. This analysis revealed a minimum
sample size of 50 per item; since participants only completed about one third of the items,
we recruited 150 participants. The experiment took 4 minutes on average and participants
were compensated $0.55 for their work.
Materials.
Each event from Expt. 2A was paired with between two to four frequencies, for which
the habitual statement would be evaluated. Frequencies were presented in terms of a
character performing the action “three times in the past time interval”. We chose to always
have the character perform the action three times to provide a strong test of a baseline
hypothesis that the habitual encodes the person has done the action several (at least 3)
times in the past.
Different time intervals were chosen for each event in order to maximize the variability
of responses within each item. Specifically, we used the endorsement model to generate
predictions based on the prior elicitation data (Expt. 2A) for each item, and chose between
two and four time intervals across which maximal variability was predicted. For example,
relatively high frequencies were chosen (e.g., time intervals of weeks and months) for items
expected to occur rather often (e.g., runs); for an item that was expected to occur
infrequently (e.g., climbs mountains), lower frequencies were chosen (e.g., time intervals of
years or longer) because the model predicted that much of the variability in endorsement
would occur in those respective ranges. In total, 93 unique items were created by pairing
frequencies with events. The full list of items and frequencies can be found in Appendix D.
Procedure.
On each trial, participants were presented with a past frequency statement for a given
event of the form: “In the past {week, 2 weeks, month, 5 years, . . . }, Person did X 3 times”.
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For example, “In the past month, Bill smoked cigarettes 3 times”. Participants were asked
whether they agreed or disagreed with the corresponding habitual sentence: “Person does X”
(e.g.,“Bill smokes cigarettes.”). Participants completed thirty-seven trials, which were
composed of the thirty-one items from the prior elicitation task randomly paired with either
a male or female character name. Six of these items were then also paired with a name of
the opposite gender (e.g., participants rated both a female character and a male character
who drank beer). These were used for an exploratory analysis on differences in endorsements
by gender of the target character.
Results. The goal of this experiment was to elicit variability in habitual
endorsements. Consistent with this goal, we found habitual sentences were endorsed for a
wide range of frequencies. When actions are very infrequent (3 times in a 5-year interval),
habituals can receive strong agreement (e.g., writes novels, climbs mountains). When actions
are relatively frequent (e.g., 3 times in a one month interval), habitual sentences can receive
less than full endorsement (e.g., wears socks, drinks coffee). In our data, actions completed
with a relatively high frequency (3 times in a one week interval) receive at a minimum 75%
endorsement, though there is still variability among them (e.g., between 10-25% disagree
that people who wore a watch or wore a bra 3 times in the past week wear a watch or wear a
bra habitually). Finally, we observe that none of our items receive less than 25%
endorsement (i.e., a maximum of about 75% of participants disagree with the habitual
utterances), reflecting the fact that these statements are not altogether false even though the
action may be done very rarely.
Endorsement model comparison. In an exploratory analysis, we found no
differences between endorsements of the habitual of characters with male and female names,
and overall, the mean endorsements by gender were strongly correlated r(93) = 0.91.
Endorsements are even more highly correlated for the six events we anticipated differences by
referent-gender: r(21) = 0.97. This lack of a difference may be because the felicity of
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Figure 8 . Endorsing generalizations about events. A: Endorsements for nine events given
different frequencies of action. B: Top right: Model fits for all ninety-three habitual sentences
by each model. C: Nine example frequency priors and posteriors upon hearing the habitual.
These distributions are inferred using both data sources from Expts. 2a and 2b.
habitual sentences depends on a comparison to individuals of both genders (i.e, habituals are
evaluated with respect to other people, not just other men or other women). Less
interestingly, the lack of a difference may be the result of gender being not very salient in our
paradigm, perhaps because the names used were not sufficiently gendered.
We now turn to our model-based analyses to better understand the endorsement data
and the contribution of our model. For all analyses, we collapse across gender of the referent
character for endorsement judgments. Parallel to our analysis of generic language
endorsements, we articulate a set of simple regression models and a fixed-threshold
alternative to our uncertain-threshold endorsement model. Analyses which use the prevalence
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prior distribution P (p) (all models except “referent frequency” regression) use a 50% mixture
of the inferred priors for each gender to construct a single prevalence prior distribution.
Parallel to our analysis in Case Study 1, we model uncertainty in the input measurements by
bootstrapping the data for the regression models and constructing joint-inference, Bayesian
data analytic models for the information-theoretic endorsement models (fixed-threshold and
uncertain-threshold; see Supplementary Model Criticism in Appendix C for a justification).
Referent frequency.
To understand the role of frequency in habitual endorsement, we use the frequency
supplied to the participants in our experiment as a predictor in a linear model. This model
predicts the same endorsement level for two actions done with the same rate. Obvious
counterexamples exist in our data set: While participants are willing to endorse that a
person “. . . climbs mountains” having done it 3 times in the past year, they are less willing
to say that a person “. . . hikes” and not willing to say that a person “. . . runs”. Some
actions done with a relative high rate (e.g., 3 times in a month) do not receive full
endorsement (e.g., smokes cigarettes; Figure 8A). Overall, the referent-frequency (in
log-scale) predicts only a fraction of the variability in responses (r2(93) = 0.325;
MSE=0.0355). In addition, for actions that are done on the time scale of years or longer
(lower median of frequency), referent frequency no longer explains endorsements
(r2(50) = 0.0662; MSE =0.0477). The prevalence baseline does appreciably worse in this
data set in comparison to the generics data set (Case Study 1) because we were able to
independently manipulate the referent-frequency separate from the prevalence priors, which
we could not do for generics about familiar categories.
Distinctiveness and referent frequency.
In our empirically elicited priors, items differ in the proportion of people who have
done the action before (the mixture parameter of the mixture model; Figure 7A x-axis). This
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mixture parameter is a major contributor to the mean of the prevalence prior distribution,
and thus relates to the cue validity of a particular feature for a particular individual
(Appendix A). Thus, we take this parameter as an index of the distinctiveness of the action,
analogous to cue validity in the case of generic language. We construct a regression model
that treats endorsement as a linear combination of the frequency given to participants and
participants’ responses to the question about the mixture parameter φ (i.e., the proportion
of people who have done the action before) as an index of distinctiveness.
This model is able to explain more of the variance in endorsements (r2(93) = 0.583;
MSE=0.022). It can differentiate events done with the same frequency (e.g., writing poems
vs. novels, 3 times in the past 5 years) by increasing endorsement of the more rare action
(novels). Still, this model fails to capture fine-grained differences in endorsement. For
example, going to the movies is a relatively nondistinctive action (many people do it) and
going three times in a year is not very frequent, and yet people still strongly endorse the
habitual (mean endorsement and 95% CI: 0.81[0.69, 0.89]), while this regression model
predicts quite lower judgments (0.41[0.41, 0.43]). On the other hand, playing the banjo three
times in the past two years is not strong evidence for the habitual, according to participants
(0.45[0.33, 0.59]). Nevertheless, because playing the banjo is a distinctive action, the
regression model wants to endorse the habitual strongly in this case (0.75[0.75, 0.76]).
Lesioned model (no vagueness).
We next examine an information-theoretic endorsement model based on a
fixed-threshold semantics. This model is identical to the full endorsement model, but is
lesioned to not have vagueness, or uncertainty about the meaning. A fixed-threshold model
commits the habitual to conveying literally that a person does the action with some
frequency, and that threshold on frequency is the same for all actions. As in Case Study 1,
we incorporate this model into a Bayesian joint-inference model to infer the fixed-threshold
and simultaneously predict both the priors data and the endorsement data (for more details
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on model implementation, see Appendix C). We assume the referent-prevalence p being
conveyed by the endorsement model (Eq. 3) is the frequency provided to participants (e.g., 3
times in the past year). Additionally, to account for statements that would be literally false
under this model (frequencies that fall below the fixed threshold), we include an additional
noise parameter, as we did for the fixed-threshold model in Case Study 1. To learn about the
credible values of the model’s parameters and generate predictions given those inferred
parameter values, we collected 2 MCMC chains of 100,000 iterations, discarding the first
50,000 iterations for burn in.
The data analytic model infers that a low threshold is likely: the Maximum
A-Posteriori threshold and 95% credible interval in units of number of times per year is 0.01
[0.01, 0.37]. Compare this with the lowest referent-frequency used in our data set: 0.6 times
per year (3 times every 5 years). Thus, all of the utterances evaluated under this
fixed-threshold model were literally true. As a result, the lowest endorsement this model can
apply to an utterance is 0.5 (since both the habitual and silence are always true). As a
result, the fixed-threshold model exhibits a small dynamic range of endorsements, similar to
the referent-frequency model (Figure 8B).
The fixed-threshold habitual updates the interpreter model’s prior beliefs differentially
depending on the item. For instance, because of the distinctiveness of climbs mountains, the
fixed-threshold endorsement model fully endorses the habitual (“Mary climbs mountains”)
even at a low frequency (Figure 8A). However, the model cannot differentiate among
different frequencies of doing the same action, because they are all above the
truth-functional threshold. It is equally true that a person does an action with non-zero
frequency for any frequency greater than zero, analogous to how “Some dogs are friendly” is
equally true whether 20% or 50% or 80% of dogs are friendly.
Overall, the fixed-threshold model is able to predict only a fraction of the variance in
human endorsements (r2(93) = 0.299; MSE=0.0369). The model does this by inferring that
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10% [1, 19] of the data is noise and that the speaker optimality parameter is 0.77 [0.70, 1.25].
Uncertain threshold model.
We used the same data analytic approach for the uncertain threshold endorsement
model and performed the same Bayesian statistical inference over the model to learn about
its parameters and predictions. Again, this model has two fewer parameters than the
fixed-threshold model (no fixed-threshold parameter and no extrinsic noise process). As
shown in Figure 8B, the uncertain-threshold endorsement model does a good job of
accounting for the variability in responses (r2(93) = 0.894; MSE=0.00598), including actions
done on the time scale of years or more (r2(50) = 0.903; MSE=0.00617).
Figure 8C provides insight into how the uncertain-threshold model is able to match
human judgments. The endorsement model simulates how an interpreter would understand
the habitual sentence. A habitual is interpreted relative the prior distribution over
frequencies, and the comparison between the frequency implied by the habitual vs. staying
silent results in different frequencies at which the generalization is good to assert. Climbing
mountains three times in the past year is good evidence that you climb mountains because it
is approximately the frequency that a listener would infer given the utterance; going for a
hike three times in the past year is correspondingly less convincing that you hike; and if you
went for a run three times in the past year, you not a person who runs. Only the
uncertain-threshold model is able to draw these subtle distinctions.
Discussion. Habitual language exhibits context-sensitivity directly parallel to that
of generic language (Case Study 1). Habituals are endorsed for a wide range of frequencies,
but show systematic patterns relative to the prior distribution of frequencies, as formalized
by the uncertain-threshold model. Again, we articulated a number of alternative models and
found that only the underspecified threshold model was able to explain the variability in
endorsements.
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In this case study, we manipulated rather than measured the referent frequency (e.g.,
the frequency with which a person drinks coffee). By manipulating the target frequency, we
have shown that it is causally related to habitual endorsements in the way predicted by our
model (and in a way that a fixed-threshold model cannot account for). The relationship is
not linear, however; habitual endorsements vary in complex ways that reflect interpreters’
prior knowledge about the event in question.
In Expt. 2B, participants were given a statement about how often a person has done
the action in the past and asked to judge the corresponding habitual statement. This design
potentially confounds an important distinction for the language of generalization: Does the
prevalence communicated by a generalization indicate an objective, past frequency or a
subjective, future expectation? In Expt. 2C, we investigate this question by teasing apart
past from predictive frequency and measuring its influence on habitual endorsement.
Experiment 2c: What is prevalence?
While past frequency is often a good indicator of future tendency, the future is under
no obligation to mimic the past. Does habitual language communicate probabilities in terms
of past frequency or future expectations? On one hand, speakers can only be certain about
what has happened in the past. On the other hand, it is important for speakers to be able to
convey their predictions of what they believe will be the case in the future.
People can change their behavior abruptly due to a variety outside events (e.g.,
developing an allergy) or intend to do an action without actually completing it (e.g., by
making a resolution). We introduce these causal events into our experimental paradigm to
measure their influence on endorsement. To provide the appropriate model-based analysis,
participants in one condition make a prediction about the future (predictive frequency). In
another condition, participants decide whether or not to endorse the habitual sentence (as in
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Expt. 2b). We then compare two uncertain-threshold models: one which uses participants’
ratings of predictive frequency as the referent prevalence and one which uses the past
frequency (as was done for Expt. 2B). In addition, we compare to a baseline linear model
that uses only the predictive frequency (no priors) to model endorsement.
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Figure 9 . A: Example empirical and predicted endorsements for habituals in three conditions.
B: Predicted frequency as a function of past frequency and condition manipulation (enabling,
preventative, and baseline). C: Model fits for the uncertain threshold model using past
frequency, linear model based on future frequency, and uncertain threshold model using
future frequency.
Method.
Participants.
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We recruited 270 participants from MTurk, using the same criteria as Expt. 2b. 120
were assigned to the predictive frequency condition and 150 were assigned to the habitual
endorsement condition. The experiment took on average 3.50 minutes (predictive frequency)
and 2 minutes (habitual endorsement). Participants were compensated $0.40.
Materials.
The events used were a subset of those used in Expts. 2A & B (21 of the original 31).
In addition, we crafted statements that were intended to either increase the frequency
(enabling; e.g., “Yesterday, Bill bought a pack of cigarettes.”) or decrease the frequency
(preventative; “Yesterday, Bill quit smoking.”) of the event in the future. In order to increase
the potential variability of responses across the experimental conditions, participants only
saw the frequencies that led to the most intermediate endorsement of the habitual in Expt.
2B. We did not include separate trials for both male and female names for the select items
we did in Expt. 2B, since we saw no differences in their endorsements of the habitual. See
Appendix D for a full list of the items and frequencies used, as well as the enabling and
preventative information.
Procedure.
The procedure was identical to Expt. 2B except for the inclusion of a second sentence
on a subset of trials (preventative and enabling trials). On all trials, participants were
presented with a past frequency sentence (same as Expt. 2B). Additionally, trials either
included preventative information, enabling information, or no additional information
(identical to Expt. 2B), in equal proportions. See Table 2 for example trials.
In the predictive frequency condition, participants were asked “In the next time
interval, how many times do you think person does action?”, where the time interval was the
same as given in the past frequency statement. In the habitual endorsement condition,
participants were asked if they agreed or disagreed with the corresponding habitual sentence
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Habitual Baseline Preventative Enabling
John smokes
cigarettes.
In the past month, John
smoked cigarettes 3 times.
In the past month, John
smoked cigarettes 3 times. Yes-
terday, John quit smoking
cigarettes.
In the past month, John
smoked cigarettes 3 times. Yes-
terday, John wanted a smoke
and bought a pack of cigarettes.
Tina volunteers
at soup kitchens.
In the past five years, Tina vol-
unteered for soup kitchens 3
times.
In the past five years, Tina
volunteered for soup kitchens
3 times. Yesterday, Tina
grew disillusioned with the soup
kitchen system and wants noth-
ing to do with it anymore.
In the past five years, Tina
volunteered for soup kitchens
3 times. Yesterday, Tina re-
searched a new soup kitchen in
the area and is going to volun-
teer with them.
Table 2
Example stimuli used in Expt. 2c.
(as in Expt. 2B).
Predictive frequency results. Figure 9B shows the mean predicted future
frequency as a function of the past frequency given to the participant and the type of causal
information given. We observe in the baseline condition that future frequency perfectly
tracks past frequency (r(21) = 0.994). That is, participants believe if a person smoked
cigarettes 3 times last month, they will smoke cigarettes 3 times next month. This result
implies that our model makes identical predictions for Expt. 2B whether the referent is past
frequency or expected future frequency (indicating, as expected, that we must look to new
data to distinguish these models). Critically, we observe the preventative information
strongly decreases and the enabling information slightly increases predicted frequency
(Figure 9B, white and dark green dots).
We confirmed these observations using a linear mixed-effects model, predicting the
log-transformed responses from the log-transformed past frequency and the experimental
condition (baseline, preventative, enabling). To account for participant and item variability
in this analysis, we also include random effects of intercept and condition for both
participants and items. Confirming that our manipulation worked as intended, the
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preventative information led to significantly lower predictions for future frequency, relative to
the baseline condition (β = −3.18; SE = 0.27; t = −11.96). There was also a tendency for
the enabling information to lead to higher predictions for future frequency, relative to
baseline (β = 0.96; SE = 0.11; t = 8.54). Finally, past frequency was a significant predictor
of predicted future frequency (β = 1.01; SE = 0.02; t = 40.80).
Habitual endorsement results. There is a clear and consistent negative effect of
preventative information on endorsements for the habitual sentences (Figure 9A; white bars).
When collapsing across items, the Bayesian Maximum A-Posteriori estimate and 95% highest
probability density interval for the true endorsement probabilities per condition are: baseline
= 0.85 [0.83, 0.87], enabling = 0.90 [0.88, 0.92], preventative = 0.29 [0.26, 0.32]. Still,
frequency — even predictive frequency — does not perfectly explain the endorsements
(r2(63) = 0.518; MSE = 4.29; Figure 9B).
We use our formal model to test whether past or predictive frequency matters for
endorsement. To formalize the predictive frequency speaker model, we use the mean
predictive frequency as the referent-prevalence p that the endorsement model (Eq. 3) aims to
convey. The past frequency model is constructed using the past frequency supplied to
participants as the referent-prevalence. We analyze this model in the same Bayesian data
analysis regime as for our previous models. We use the same priors over the parameters as
before and learn about the posterior distribution by collecting three independent MCMC
chains of 100,000 iterations (removing the first 50,000 for burn-in). Figure 9C shows the
resulting model predictions for the past frequency and the predictive frequency endorsement
models. Participants’ judgments of the habitual statements was indeed influenced by the
causal manipulations in the way predicted by the endorsement model that uses the
predictive frequency as the referent prevalence (r2(63) = 0.931; MSE = 0.00594). The model
based on past frequency does not make different predictions for the different causal
manipulation conditions and does a poor job at explaining the endorsements
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(r2(63) = 0.0334; MSE = 0.0833). This result strongly suggests that prevalence represents a
predictive belief about the future.
Discussion
Habitual language conveys generalizations about events. Our model decides if a
habitual sentence is a pragmatically useful way to describe the rate at which a person does
an action, taking into account a naive interpreter’s prior beliefs about the event (measured in
Expt. 2A). Our computational model endorses statements that communicate generalizations
about events with the same sensitivity to context and frequency that people exhibit (Expt.
2B & C). In Expt. 2B, we varied the type of event and the past frequency with which the
person did the action, and found graded endorsements of the corresponding habitual
sentences. By manipulating (rather than measuring) the referent frequency, we showed how
alternative models were unable to account for the gradience in endorsement. In particular,
we show that prior knowledge in an information-theoretic, communicative model is not
sufficient to produce gradience in endorsement: The fixed-threshold model, which has these
components, does not make different predictions for different frequencies. Only our uncertain
threshold model was able to precisely account for the wide range of endorsements.
In Expt. 2C, we further investigated the nature of the underlying prevalence scale by
introducing causal information that enabled and prevented future occurrences of the action.
We used the empirically-measured predicted future frequency as the object of communication
for our endorsement model. We found that the endorsement model that seeks to
communicate its predictions (rather than its observations) is a better model of habitual
endorsements under these situations. That is, habitual language (and generalization
language more generally) is fundementally about conveying people’s predictive beliefs, not
what has actually happened.
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In these experiments, we introduced participants to novel actors and, by doing so, were
able to directly manipulate the referent frequency. The kinds of events we used were familiar
to participants (e.g., running) and thus we measured the prevalence priors for those events.
In our final case study, we experimentally manipulate the prevalence priors, testing their
causal influence over endorsements. In addition, we further we extend our theory to the
language of causal relationships.
Case Study 3: Causal Language
Language about causal relationships manifests in generalization. The utterance “Fire
causes smoke” relates to “This fire caused this smoke” in a way analogous to how “John
runs” relates to “John ran yesterday”. We explore this hypothesis in our third case study:
causal language or causals (e.g., “A causes B”).
The problem of causal induction—knowing that one thing causes another—has been
studied extensively in human psychology (Cheng, 1997; Cheng & Novick, 1992; Griffiths &
Tenenbaum, 2005, 2009). Classically, this is cast as a problem of inducing an unobservable
relation (type causation) from observable events or contingency data. We take a different
approach, examining type causation by the language used to describe it (e.g., “A causes B”).
We explore the idea that such language conveys a generalization about token or actual
causation (e.g., “A caused B, in this instance”) and that our theory of the language of
generalizations extends in a natural way to describe causal language. Ascribing causation to
an individual event (token or actual causation) is itself a complex, inferential process (e.g.,
depending on counterfactual reasoning; Gerstenberg, Goodman, Lagnado, & Tenenbaum,
2015), which we do not try to model here.
In this paper, we posit that prevalence priors are a mediating representation between
abstract conceptual structure and the language of generalization. In this last set of
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experiments, we explicitly test the relationship between the prevalence priors and
endorsements of generalizations about causes by manipulating the priors.
Experiment 3a: Manipulating prevalence priors
In this experiment, we manipulate participants’ background knowledge, measuring
these beliefs in order to check whether the manipulation was successful. Experiment 3B
(causal endorsement) will then use a very similar experimental procedure in exploring the
language of causal generalizations.
Method.
Participants.
We recruited 160 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were
restricted to those with U.S. IP addresses and who had at least a 95% work approval rating.
The experiment took on average 1.70 minutes and participants were compensated $0.50 for
their work.
Materials.
Participants were told a story of a scientific experiment testing different substances to
produce an effect (either to make animals sleepy or make plants grow tall). Our cover stories
were constructed so that the potential cause could have some plausible intuitive mechanism
that could give rise to the property (e.g., a naturally occurring herb causing animals to be
sleepy). The two cover stories can be seen in Table 3.
Participants were then shown “previous experimental results”, which followed one of
four distributions represented as a table of numbers. In two of the conditions, participants
saw results that came from a single underlying distribution (common conditions). In one of
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these conditions, all causes produced a strong effect (average efficacy approximately 98%; the
common strong condition). In the second of these conditions, all causes produced a weak
effect (average efficacy approximately 20%; the common weak condition). The two other
conditions used distributions in which some experiments resulted in either no or very few
successes (i.e., produced 0, 1, or 2 successes), and others that either had strong or weak
effects as above. These are the rare strong and rare weak distributions.
. Plants Animals
Cover story On this planet, there is a plant
called feps and your team wants to
figure out how to make these plants
grow tall. Your team runs experi-
ments trying to make feps grow tall
with different fertilizers.
On this planet, there are animals
called cheebas and your team of sci-
entists wants to figure out how to
make these animals sleepy. Your
team runs experiments trying to
make cheebas sleepy with different
naturally occurring herbs.
Evidence statement Your team gave fertilizer B to 100
different feps. Of those 100 treated,
2 feps grew tall.
Your team gave herb C to 100 differ-
ent cheebas. Of those 100 treated,
98 cheebas were made sleepy.
Table 3
Cover stories and example evidence statements for the two sets of materials used in Expt. 3
Procedure.
The experiment was a single trial: Each participant saw only one cover story with one
distribution of previous experiments. Participants were told that they were an
astronaut-scientist on a distant planet trying to figure out how some system works (i.e., how
to make a certain kind of animal sleepy with different herbs or how to make a plant grow tall
with different fertilizers). The story for the sleepy animals condition read:
You are an astronaut-scientist exploring a distant planet. On this planet,
there are animals called cheebas and your team of scientists wants to figure out
how to make these animals sleepy. Your team runs experiments trying to make
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Prevalence prior manipulation
A B C
D E
Figure 10 . Overview of Experiment 3. A-C: Results of previous experiments are shown
one at a time, described in text and displayed in a table. One of the results was lost.
Participants are asked to review previous results once all displayed. D: Prior elicitation
task: Participants predict the results of the next 5 experiments. E: Causal endorsement task:
Results of previously lost experiment are found and participants are asked to evaluate the
causal generalization.
cheebas sleepy with different naturally occurring herbs. The results are shown
below:
Participants then clicked a button to show the results of the experiments, which
appeared one at a time in a random order (following a particular distribution). Experimental
results were also are described linguistically (e.g., “Your team gave herb A to 100 different
cheebas. Of those 100 treated, 98 cheebas were made sleepy.”) as well as displayed in a table
showing the number of successes (e.g., “animals made sleepy”) per number of attempts
(always 100 per experiment; Figure 10A). We described the results of these individual
experiments using token-level causal language (e.g., “98 cheebas were made sleepy”) to imply
that actual causation occurred in these cases. Participants see the results of eleven
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experiments, though they are told the results of one experiment were lost and a “?” was
placed in the table (Figure 10B). (These lost results would be found in the causal
endorsement task, Expt. 3B). After participants viewed the results of the 10 experiments
(and 1 missing experiment), they are told to review the results of the experiments before
continuing (Figure 10C).
Upon clicking the continue button, the table of experiment results is removed and
participants are told that five more experiments were conducted that day and asked to
predict the results of those experiments (Figure 10D). Participants were given five slider bars
ranging from 0 - 100 to rate the number of predicted successes out of 100 attempts. After
responding, participants then completed an attention check survey where they were asked
what the team of scientists was investigating (choosing a response from a drop-down menu
with 12 options) and to input one of the numerical results they saw on the previous screen.
This attention check served to confirm that participants had encoded both relevant aspects
of the experiment (the domain and the frequencies).
Results. 20 participants were excluded from the analysis for failing to answer both
of the attention check questions correctly, leaving a total of 140 responses for analysis. The
empirically elicited distributions of responses were not appreciably different for our two cover
stories (herbs making animals sleepy, fertilizer making plants grow tall) and thus we collapse
the data across these two stories. The distributions that resulted from participants
predicting the causal efficacy of the new substances are shown in Figure 11A. As is visually
apparent, the empirical prevalence distributions differ between conditions and nicely
recapitulate the distributions supplied in the different experimental conditions, suggesting
that the manipulation does indeed change participants’ representations of what probabilities
are likely to occur in each experimental condition. This diversity is important because the
model of generalizations predicts differences in endorsement—for the same referent
prevalence—depending on these priors.
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Experiment 3b: Causal Endorsements
In this experiment, we tested whether the manipulated priors of Expt. 3A are causally
related to the endorsement of causal statements. Most of the experimental design was
identical to that of Expt. 3A.
Method.
Participants.
We recruited 400 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were
restricted to those with U.S. IP addresses and who had at least a 95% work approval rating.
None of the participants had participated in Experiment 3a. The experiment consisted of one
trial and took on average 1.40 minutes; participants were compensated $0.25 for their work.
Procedure and materials.
The materials were the same as in Expt. 3A.
The first part of the experimental trial was the same as in Expt. 3A (the table of
“previous experiments”; Figure 10A-C). Upon continuing beyond the first part of the trial,
the table of results and background story were removed from the screen and the participant
is told that the results of the “lost experiment” were found (the experiment with a “?” in the
table).22 The results are reported to the participant in terms of how many out of 100 of the
attempts were successful. Participants saw one of two reported frequencies: 20% or 70%
(randomized between-subjects). Participants were then asked to judge the causal sentence
22We chose to have the scientists report on an earlier “lost experiment” to suggest a binomial generative
process for the experiments wherein the scientists planned to perform 11 experiments, as opposed to alternative
design wherein an 11th experiment is reported. Such a continuation of the series of experiments could imply
a generative model following a geometric distribution where the scientists repeat the experiment until they
reach one that is successful.
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(e.g., “Herb X makes the animals sleepy”) by either clicking “Yes” or “No” (Figure 10E).
This allows us to test whether endorsement of a causal sentence for a given actual frequency
is affected by the causal priors induced by our manipulation. After responding, participants
completed the same attention check as Expt. 3a.
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Figure 11 . Endorsing generalizations about causes. A: Empirical prevalence prior dis-
tributions elicited following prior manipulation cover story (Expt. 3a). B: Endorsement
model predictions and human elicited endorsements for four manipulated prevalence prior
distributions (colors) and two referent prevalence levels (facets).
Results. 42 participants were excluded from the analysis for failing to answer both of
the attention check questions correctly, leaving a total of 358 responses for analysis. As in our
other analyses of endorsement responses, we computed the Bayesian Maximum A-Posteriori
(MAP) estimate and 95% highest probability density interval of the true population
probability of endorsing the statement, assuming a uniform prior. These are shown for the
different experimentally-manipulated priors and referent prevalences in Figure 11B.
As predicted by our model, endorsements for a causal statement were sensitive to the
referent prevalence of causal events and, critically, to the background distribution of other
causes. When many other causes produced the effect very reliably (common strong
condition), very few participants endorsed the causal statement for a causal frequency of 0.2,
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and were at chance when the causal frequency was 0.7 (Figure 11, blue bars). By contrast,
when many other causes failed to produce the effect and those that did were not very reliable
(rare weak condition; green in figure), at least half of participants endorsed the causal
statement for a cause with causal prevalence of 0.2, and were at ceiling when the prevalence
was 0.7. The other two conditions (rare deterministic and common weak) led to
endorsements intermediate between these two conditions. These effects were predicted by
our model with strong quantitative accuracy (r2(8) = 0.835; MSE = 0.0123).
Discussion
In our third case study, we applied our model to generalizations about causal events,
without any changes. In this domain, we successfully manipulated participants’ beliefs about
the expected prevalence of a causal relationship in a domain (Expt. 3A). This was done
using both unimodal (common weak, common strong) and bimodal (rare weak, rare strong)
distributions. In Expt. 3B, we showed that these manipulated priors influenced
endorsements of the corresponding causal statements. In addition to further demonstrating
the generality of this theory, these experiments show that the prevalence prior P (p) is
causally related to endorsements of generalizations in language.
In these experiments, we used two cover stories that described plausible causal events:
herbs making animals sleepy and fertilizers making plants grow tall. We chose these items
because there was a plausible causal mechanism that could give rise to the property and
these causal events could have ambiguous causal power associated with them (e.g., it is
plausible that there are herbs that only weakly make animals sleepy and it is also plausible
that there are herbs that almost deterministically make animals sleepy). These two features
of the domains make them particularly amenable to manipulation. It is likely that other
domain knowledge would interact with the experimentally-supplied “experimental data” to
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form a hybrid belief distribution.23 For example, physical causal systems (e.g., billiard balls
hitting each other) could strongly induce near-deterministic notions of causality, analogous
to our strong priors conditions. Causal systems that demonstrate surprising or a priori
unlikely effects (e.g., liquids melting concrete) could induce rarity about the existence of a
non-zero causal power, analogous to our rare prior conditions. Our theory would predict that
differences in endorsement in these cases would be mediated by differences in the
corresponding prevalence prior distributions.
General Discussion
The human species is remarkable not only because we can extract useful
generalizations from the world, but because we can convey these generalizations to each
other succinctly using language. Generalizations expressed in language (e.g., “John runs.”,
“Dogs are friendly.”, “Fire causes smoke.”) are a premier example of how simple
statements—statements understood by even the youngest language users—can convey rich
meanings and display complex sensitivities to context. We have argued that the core
meaning of such linguistic expressions can be understood by three ingredients: Probability,
vagueness, and context. That generics are vague does not preclude them from being treated
by formal models. A vague threshold meaning operating over a speaker’s inductive beliefs,
formalized by predictive probability, leads to complex, quantitative interactions with
background knowledge, which closely tracks human judgments.
We tested this theory by exploring its implications for the simplest judgments a person
can make about a sentence: an endorsement or truth judgment. Truth judgments are the
standard measurement for semantic theories, but are often limited to the intuitions of a
23If this were happening in our domains, we would expect this to show up in the results of Expt. 3A.
Participants’ predictions about the likely causal power of new causes would be expected to show a mixture of
their abstract, intuitive theories and the experimentally supplied data.
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single or a few trained theorists, often producing only binary or ternary judgments (i.e., true,
false, and possibly indeterminate). Our model accounted for these standard linguistic
intuitions about a number of philosophically puzzling generic statements (Worked Examples).
We went beyond intuitions, however, measuring truth judgments of naive language users,
which revealed substantial gradience in endorsements. These fine-grained, quantitative
measurements pose real challenges for verbal theories of generics, which can only predict
qualitative differences. The framework we propose is sufficiently precise to predict
quantitative gradience, and we showed that the gradience in truth judgments depends in
systematic ways on an interpreter’s prior beliefs about prevalence. We provided strict tests
of our formal model by both measuring and manipulating listeners’ background knowledge as
well as comparing our model to a number of alternatives. In each case, our model provided a
strong quantitative fit to human judgements while other models fell short.
The fact that our model applies equally as well to generic and habitual language sheds
light on a long-attested relationship. The analogy of habituality (e.g., “John runs”) and
genericity (e.g., “Dogs have four legs”) has typically been assumed in the literature following
the original suggestion by Carlson (1977). The relationship, however, has been never been
empirically tested nor formally described. This paper presents the first empirical evidence
that the reasoning involved in understanding generic and habitual sentences are similar: The
same uncertain threshold mechanism operating over prior beliefs explains judgments of both
kinds of statements (Expts. 1 & 2).
In our model, an utterance conveying a generalization updates a listener’s a priori
beliefs about the prevalence of the property for that category. Since the prevalence prior
includes the information necessary to compute cue validity (see Appendix A), the cue validity
of the feature for the new category is added to the common ground between interlocutors.
Thus, given the knowledge represented in a prevalence prior, generics communicate
information both about the prevalence of the feature in the new category (via the literal
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semantics) as well as the cue validity of the feature for the new category. For example, if a
listener hears “Alligators grow to be 10-feet long”, they will update their personal beliefs
both about the prevalence of 10-footedness among alligators as well as the probability that
an animal is an alligator given that it is 10 feet long. To our knowledge, this is the first
theory of generics that describes how the informational contribution of a generic relates to
cue validity.24 This also means that our computational framework makes predictions about
the cue validity implied by different generalizations, without any further assumptions.
We propose that the language of generalization conveys predictive probabilities.
Communicating probabilities might seem contrary to the long attested failures in reasoning
about probability (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Our theory suggests that the problems with
understanding probabilities observed in classic, cognitive psychology paradigms are a
problem in understanding explicit probabilities expressed using numerical language, a
historically quite recent innovation (cf., Levinson, 1995). Rather than conveying probabilities
explicitly, the language of generalization conveys them implicitly. In other words, we argue
that the utterance “70% of birds fly” is a precise statement about how many birds fly in the
way that “John is 6’3”" is a precise statement about the height of John, whereas “Birds fly”
is a vague statement more akin to the utterance “John is tall”. The latter statements are
easier to process, understood at an earlier age, and may be more useful for human reasoning.
Indeed, even infants are actually quite good with reasoning about probabilities, but in ways
that are not explicit or tied to the numerical language of probability (Xu & Denison, 2009;
Xu & Garcia, 2008).
In the rest of this discussion, we further discuss the contribution of our modeling
framework to empirical and theoretical work on the language of generalization, elaborate
further on the role of conceptual knowledge in our modeling framework, describe how our
model relates to language understanding more generally including theories of vagueness, and
24We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this.
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sketch an argument for how our formal representation of the language of generalization could
provide a relatively simple acquisition problem for a language learner.
Generics and genericity
The statistical vs. conceptual distinction for theories of generics, described in detail
earlier in this paper, is roughly co-extensive with the distinction between theories of the
truth conditions of generics and the mental phenomenon of genericity, respectively (Nickel,
2016). Truth conditions are unified criteria that all generics must satisfy in order to be true.
Genericity, on the other hand, is thought to be a non-linguistic, psychological phenomenon
previously explained either in terms of pragmatics (Declerck, 1991) or meta-semantics
(Leslie, 2007; Liebesman, 2011; Nickel, 2016; Sterken, 2015). A full account of generic
language must include both a theory of generics (i.e., truth conditions) and a complementary
theory of genericity (Nickel, 2016).
Our model leverages the insights of formal semantics and computational cognitive
modeling to articulate how an agent should update their beliefs based on a generic sentence.
The Bayesian model provides a clean separation of the semantics of a generic statement
(represented formally by a threshold function) from world knowledge (represented by the
prevalence prior). We, thus, chart-out a single answer to the semantic question “what do
generics mean?”, while also formalizing how background knowledge influences generic
understanding (a question about genericity). Previous theoretical accounts have either aimed
to account for the context-sensitivity of generics by positing distinct semantic constructs
(e.g., relative vs absolute generics; Cohen, 1999) or positing a semantics that cannot be
separated from world knowledge (Leslie, 2008). The modeling approach we take here
demonstrates how the context-sensitivity of generics can emerge via the interplay of a stable
(but vague) semantics and diverse background knowledge. This model is thus the first step
towards unifying conceptual approaches to genericity with an inherently quantitative natural
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language semantics for generics.
Relation to intuitive theories
Our theory assumes that listeners and speakers employ real-world knowledge of objects
and events in order to use and interpret the language of generalization. It is this real-world
knowledge (presently formalized in terms of a prevalence prior) where issues about domain
specific beliefs, interpretation of properties (Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), over-hypotheses
(Leslie, 2008), and essentialism (Gelman, 2003) can all play a role. We hypothesize that all of
this knowledge feeds into participants’ predictions, measured through judgments about
prevalence. That is, even though our underlying semantics is defined in terms prevalence of
individual properties, this does not imply that the concepts involved in generic language
understanding are defined merely by their properties. Instead, complex intuitive theories
(that may reflect, for example conceptual role, see Goodman et al., 2015) give rise to
prevalence priors, which then yield judgements about generic statements. Thus, it is the
output of these cognitive processes and conceptual understanding—intuitions about
prevalence—to which this framework brings precision and clarity. Applying the same
precision and clarity to the more abstract aspects of conceptual knowledge including
property knowledge, essentialism, etc. is an important next step for this line of work.
Probabilistic causal models (Gopnik, 2003; Pearl, 1988) and their generalization in
probabilistic programs (Goodman et al., 2015) are obvious starting places to look for such a
formalism for conceptual structure and higher-order abstractions.
The fact that conceptual knowledge is not a part of our formal semantics does not
imply that such knowledge is unrelated to communicating generalizations. In fact, we saw in
Expt. 2C that it was participants’ predictions about the future that led to the prevalence
computation involved in the endorsement decision. Intuitive theories guide these predictions,
and might provide new insight into classic puzzles of generics. We described in the Worked
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Examples how our model treats “Supreme Court Justices have even social security numbers”
as infelicitous even when 100% of justices have even SSNs, because a speaker’s subjective
probability that the next justice would have an even SSN is likely 50%. However, were we to
learn much more surprising information—for instance, if every Supreme Court Justice in U.S.
history had a social security number which was a prime number (a much lower probability
outcome)—the shear suspiciousness could compel an observer to revise their theory of the
domain (appealing perhaps to a conspiracy), update their subjective probability of future
instances, and endorse such a generic.
Not only does conceptual knowledge influence interpretation via beliefs about
prevalence, but conceptual knowledge may very well be what a speaker intends to
communicate. Like other models in the probabilistic pragmatics tradition, our model
distinguishes the relevant variables for the truth-functional semantics (e.g., a threshold and a
prevalence) from those that impact the speaker’s utility in producing the utterance. A
speaker’s utility comes from addressing an implicit goal of communication, sometimes
referred to as the Question Under Discussion or QUD (Roberts, 1996). The separation of
the QUD from the literal, truth-functional denotation of the utterance is an important
theoretical distinction made explicit in our formal modeling approach (Goodman & Frank,
2016). For simplicity, the model presented here assumes the QUD is about prevalence.
However, the model makes nearly identical predictions if the QUD concerns abstract
parameters of the prevalence distributions (e.g., if the speaker intends to convey that “K is
the kind of thing that Fs”; cf., Prasada & Dillingham, 2006), something much closer to
communicating conceptual understanding. This observation may prove useful for
constructing models of speakers whose goals are to convey abstract relations between kinds
and properties.
Conceptual knowledge concerning the strikingness or dangerousness of properties and
their relation to generic language has been of particular interest to psychologists and
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philosophers since Leslie (2007). We described before that the strikingness of certain
properties plausibly influences prevalence priors or a speaker’s predictions about future
prevalence. We have collected pilot data suggesting these constructs are indeed altered as a
result of introducing information about the dangerousness of features to participants (e.g., as
in Cimpian et al., 2010). More empirical work is needed to understand whether and how
strikingness influences generic understanding above and beyond the probabilistic constructs
we have posited in our theory.
The comparison class
The probabilistic communicative model we introduce in this paper assumes shared
background knowledge about the statistics of an event or property in question, represented
by the prior belief distribution over the prevalence P (p). We constructed prevalence priors
for a property, event, or cause by considering other possible categories having the property,
people doing the action, or causes producing the effect, respectively. In Expt. 3, we
empirically demonstrated the influence of other categories on endorsements of causal
generalizations. Collectively, these other kinds, people, or causes form comparison classes
against which the referent-category is evaluated. Thus, the prevalence prior P (p) is actually
a conditional distribution constructed with respect to some comparison class C: P (p | C).
In this paper, we have assumed particular values of C for our three case studies
(animals, people, and possible causes, respectively). We think the choice of these classes is
intuitive, but it is a limitation of this work that we do not derive these choices from more
general information-theoretic considerations. The problem of choosing a comparison class,
however, is not unique to the language of generalization, but is a problem for any theory of
vague or underspecified language (e.g., gradable adjectives like tall and vague quantifiers like
many; Bale, 2011; Qing & Franke, 2014; Schmidt, Goodman, Barner, & Tenenbaum, 2009;
Solt, 2009; Solt & Gotzner, 2012). We have begun to explore how pragmatic reasoning and
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world knowledge can flexibly adjust the comparison class to appropriately suit the context
(e.g., how a “short” basketball player is short for a basketball player while a “tall” basketball
player is tall for a person; Tessler, Lopez-Brau, & Goodman, 2017). It remains to be seen
how such principles could operate on richly structured, hierarchical knowledge about
categories and properties that would be important for interpreting generic language.
The employment of comparison classes in our model provides additional flexibility
towards modeling different communicative goals. The comparison classes used in our case
studies were constructed with respect to the category (other animals, other people, other
possible causes). Thus, our endorsement model assumes that the QUD was “what has this
feature?”. Any part of a sentence, however, can be brought into focus (e.g., by prosody) and
turned into an answer to a QUD: “Dogs have four legs” (as opposed to other animals), “Dogs
have four legs” (as opposed to eating or doing other things with four legs), “Dogs have four
legs” (as opposed to two legs, three legs, six legs), “Dogs have four legs” (as opposed to
having four of other limbs/body parts), “Dogs have four legs” (as opposed to having other
features). It has long been noted that the same generalization can be used to address
multiple QUDs (Krifka, 1995), and we posit that differences in interpretation are the result
of multiple distinct comparison classes competing for influence. Prosody provides a good cue
towards resolving the comparison class, and pragmatic reasoning is likely relevant here as
well (Declerck, 1986; Tessler et al., 2017). In this work, we focused on category-wise
comparison classes purely for methodological convenience. Future work should investigate
the factors that give rise to feature-wise interpretations of generalizations (e.g., “Dogs have
four legs”, as opposed to having other features), other QUDs generics can address, how the
relevant comparison classes are constructed, and how these inferences interact with threshold
inference.
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Genericity and vagueness
We have argued that generalizations in language are vague descriptions of prevalence in
a way analagous to how gradable adjectives like “tall” are vague descriptions of some
underlying degree scale (e.g., height). Vague predicates like “tall”, however, exhibit a
number of additional phenomena that we do not suppose generics or generalizations would
necessarily exhibit. For example, vague predicates admit borderline cases (e.g., a person who
is neither tall nor not tall). A priori, it is unclear whether one could construct borderline
cases with generics or habituals without sounding like a contradiction (e.g., “John both runs
and doesn’t run”). Additionally, sorites paradoxes can be constructed out of arguments using
vague predicates, and it is not clear that generics or habituals could be used to construct
such arguments (e.g., a person who runs one day a week less than John [who runs habitually]
is still a person who runs). No experimental data yet bears on these ideas, but would be
useful for further understanding the relationship between the language of generalization and
vague predicates.
For now, we understand both genericity and vagueness as analogous linguistic
phenomena insofar as they can both be thought of as the result of a listener being uncertainty
as to the exact truth conditions (e.g., an uncertain threshold). This sort of “lexical
uncertainty” is a kind of parameter learning problem (e.g., the listener knows the form of the
truth conditions, but not the values of some variables) which can be formally distinguished
from other sorts of uncertain truth conditions better modeled as a structure learning
problem (e.g., lexical ambiguity). Further work should be done to better understand the
kinds of context-sensitive linguistic phenomena that are modeled as parameter vs. structure
learning problems to construct a richer typology of underspecified linguistic expressions.
Our view of understanding the language of generalization involving reasoning about an
uncertain threshold is reminiscent of Williamson and Simons (1992)’s epistemicist view on
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vagueness. This view holds that when a speaker utters a vague statement, there exists an
objective set of criteria determining whether the entity in question satisfies the vague
predicate (i.e., whether or not the utterance is true). Vagueness emerges from uncertainty
about the details of those objective criteria (e.g., the precise value of a threshold). This
uncertainty in turn could be the result of a population of speakers using slightly different
criteria. Listeners then will not know exactly what kind of speaker they are dealing with a
priori and normatively should maintain uncertainty about the truth conditions (see Lassiter
& Goodman, 2015 for an extended discussion of vagueness involving resolving the value of a
free semantic variable in context).
Acquiring the language of generalization
Perhaps the most surprising aspect of the language of generalization is how difficult it
is to formalize, given how common it is in child-directed and child-produced speech (Gelman,
Coley, Rosengren, Hartman, & Pappas, 1998; Gelman et al., 2004). Generics are often
contrasted with quantifier language (e.g., “some”, “most”, “all”), whose truth conditions are
easy to formalize but which pose difficulty for young children to acquire (Brandone, Gelman,
& Hedglen, 2014; Gelman et al., 2015). Leslie (2008) argues that the necessary complexity of
a formal account of generics and the simplicity with which young children acquire generics
imply that the normal tools for describing the semantics of quantified utterances (i.e., a
truth-functional threshold) are inappropriate for generics.25
Rejecting the tools of truth-functional semantics for the language of generalization
would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater: In fact, from a learning perspective, our
semantics of generics can be viewed as simpler than that of quantifier semantics. With some
reasonable assumptions about the hypothesis space of semantic meanings, the acquisition of
25This argument is a purely semantic argument which ignores evidence that children’s difficulty with
quantifiers stems from pragmatic issues (Musolino & Lidz, 2006).
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a threshold-based truth-functional meaning [[u]](p, θ) := p > θ requires learning three
distinct aspects of meaning: (1) the dimension being described (i.e., prevalence p), (2) the
polarity of the relation (i.e., > vs. <), and (3) the value of the threshold (e.g., θ = 0 for
“some”, θ = 0.5 for “most”).26 If a learner first acquires the dimension and the polarity (i.e.,
generics have to do with prevalence in some positive way), a rational learner should then
represent uncertainty over possible thresholds θ. For quantifier semantics, a learner would
then need to learn the context-invariant value of the threshold θ, but for generics, she could
have an adult-like semantics for generics by maintaining uncertainty about the threshold.
That is, the language of generalization is learned once aspects (1) and (2) are understood.
Thus, under our framework, generics should not only be learned before quantifiers but could
also facilitate the acquisition of quantifiers because of their shared logical form.
There is a secondary argument for why our semantics presents an easy learning
problem. We have assumed the truth functional threshold θ comes from a uniform
distribution over the unit interval [0, 1], which is mathematically equivalent to a
continuously-valued or soft semantics wherein the degree to which the utterance is true is
proportional to the degree itself, in this case prevalence p:
∫ 1
0 δp>θ dθ = p. The model for
generic interpretation (Eq. 1) then becomes: L(p | u) ∝ p · P (p) This soft semantics
(corresponding intuitively to a meaning like “the higher the prevalence, the better”, or
simply “more is better”) is perhaps the simplest quantitative semantics one could posit. The
difficulty in acquiring the meaning of quantifiers, then, is a difficulty in recognizing a
fixed-threshold semantics as a special case of this more is better semantics. We leave for
future work the precise implementation of such an acquisition model.
26This particular framing of the acquisition process ignores the potentially different impact of pragmatic
reasoning on generics vs. quantifiers.
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Conclusion
It might seem paradoxical that a part of language that is so common in communication
and central to learning should be vague. Shouldn’t speakers and teachers want to express
their ideas as crisply as possible? To the contrary, underspecification can be efficient, given
that context can be relied upon to resolve uncertainty in the moment (Piantadosi, Tily, &
Gibson, 2012). In our work, context takes the form of shared beliefs between speakers and
listeners. By leveraging this common ground, the language of generalizations provides a
powerful way to communicate and learn abstract knowledge, which would otherwise be
difficult or costly information to acquire through direct experience.
Categories are inherently unobservable. You cannot see the category dog, only some
number of instances of it. Yet we easily talk about these abstractions, conveying hard-won
generalizations to each other and down through generations. The theory presented here
provides the first computational perspective on how we communicate generalizations,
illustrating how beliefs play a central role in understanding the meaning of words.
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Appendix A: The Relationship between the Prevalence Prior and Cue Validity
Cue validity is defined for a particular category–property pair (e.g., mosquitos and
carry malaria), and relates to the referent prevalence (e.g., how many mosquitos carry
malaria) via Bayes’ Rule:
P (k | f) = P (f | k) · P (k)
Z
where Z = ∑k′∈K P (f | k′) · P (k′), the average or marginal prevalence of the feature (e.g.,
carrying malaria) in other categories k′.
The prevalence prior P (p) using the generic interpretation model (Eq. 1) is a
probability distribution over prevalence for different categories k′.
Claim: The normalizing constant for computing cue validity is equal to the expected
value of the prevalence prior distribution: E[P (p)] = Z
Proof:
By the definition of the expectation of a distribution:
E[P (p)] =
∑
p
p · P (p) (5)
The probability of a prevalence p can be decomposed into the prior probability of a
category k and the likelihood of the prevalence p given that category k:
P (p) = P (p | k) · P (k). We assume here, without loss of generality, that each category
corresponds to one and only one prevalence p. Thus, P (p | k) = 1 if k ∈ Kp, a set of
categories that have a given prevalence: Kp = {k′ : pk′ = p}. Then, consider the partition of
the set of all categories K into non-overlapping Kp. Thus:
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P (p) =
∑
k′∈Kp
P (p | k′) · P (k′)
=
∑
k′∈Kp
P (k′) (6)
since ∀k′ ∈ Kp : P (p | k′) = 1. Returning to Eq. 5, we have:
E[P (p)] =
∑
p
p
∑
k′∈Kp
P (k′)
=
∑
p
∑
k′∈Kp
p · P (k′) (7)
The set of all partitioned subsets Kp is in a one-to-one correspondence with the set of
all prevalences p. Thus, we have:
=
∑
Kp
∑
k′∈Kp
p · P (k′) (8)
Then, since ∪pKp = K, we have
=
∑
k′∈K
p · P (k′)
=
∑
k′∈K
P (f | k′) · P (k′)
= Z (9)
.
THE LANGUAGE OF GENERALIZATION 102
Appendix B: Measuring Cue Validity
In Experiment 1, we articulated an alternative model by measuring cue validity (and
prevalence) and predicting generic endorsement from a linear combination of these
parameters. In a small review of the literature, we discovered different methods for
measuring cue validity; in piloting, we found these different methods led to different results.
Therefore, we propose three a priori desiderata that a measurement of cue validity should
satisfy. We describe two experiments that represent the primary methods for measuring cue
validity and compare them with these desiderata in mind. Finally, we compare the cue
validity measured using these different methods to cue validity derived from our prevalence
prior elicitation task (Expt. 1b, main text).
Desiderata
Measuring cue validity involves collecting participants’ judgments that relate to the
probability that an exemplar is a member of a kind given that it has a feature:
P (x ∈ k | x ∈ f). There are several ways one could measure cue validity. Here we consider
two measures: The first has participants estimate the cue validity probability
P (x ∈ k | x ∈ f) directly, a common technique in the literature on generic language (e.g.,
Khemlani et al., 2012; Prasada et al., 2013), and another has participants freely produce
categories given a feature (i.e., draw a sample from the conditional distribution on kinds
given a feature; Cree et al., 2006). We will refer to the former as the direct question method
and the latter as the free production method.
Are the direct question and the free productions equally valid for measuring cue
validity? We propose a priori three boundary conditions that a measurement of cue validity
should satisfy. For each, we provide four examples from our larger stimulus set on generics
(Case Study 1) which will be used to evaluate each measure.
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1. Completely diagnostic features: Some features are only present in one (or a very small
number) of categories. Examples include: carrying malaria (mosquitos), carrying Lyme
disease (ticks, deer), having manes (lions), having pouches (marsupials, including most
famously: kangaroos). The cue validity of these features for the corresponding
categories should be very high (at least 0.5 and possibly close to 1).
2. Completely absent features: Many features are completely absent in many kinds. For
these, the cue validity should be extremely low or 0. There are infinite examples. The
ones we will use are has wings (leopard), has a mane (shark), has spots (kangaroo), has
a pouch (tiger).
3. Completely undiagnostic features: A number of features are shared by almost every
category. The cue validity of these features for particular categories should be
extremely low or 0. The ones we will use are: is female (robin), is male (lion), is
juvenile (kangaroo), is full-grown (leopard). Learning that an entity is female tells you
almost nothing about what kind of animal it is.
We collected cue validity ratings by running both a direct question and a free
production experiment. For the free production experiment, the cue validity is the
proportion of responses of the target category (e.g., “mosquitos”) for the property (e.g.,
“carries malaria”). Of primary interest is the measurement for the desiderata items described
above. Links to the experiments can be found on https://github.com/mhtess/genlang-paper.
Experimental materials
Materials were the same for both experiments. These were a collection of familiar
properties and animal categories used in Expt. 1a (endorsement of generic statements)
described in the main text. There were twenty-one properties in total.
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Direct question experiment
Method.
Participants.
We recruited 40 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were
restricted to those with U.S. IP addresses and who had at least a 95% work approval rating.
The experiment took on average 5 minutes and participants were compensated $0.75 for
their work.
Procedure.
Following the procedure in Khemlani et al. (2012) and Prasada et al. (2013),
participants were presented with prompts of the following form:
Imagine you come across a thing that f. What are the odds that it is a k?
Participants responded using a slider bar with endpoints labeled “unlikely” and “likely”.
The slider appeared with no handle present; participants had to click on the slider for the
slider handle to appear.
Participants completed the thirty target trials (corresponding to the thirty generic
statements used in Expt. 1a) in addition to ten filler trials (total number of trials = 40).
The filler trials were made up of random category–property pairings. Trials were presented
in a randomized order.
Free production experiment
Method.
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Participants.
We recruited 100 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Participants were
restricted to those with U.S. IP addresses and who had at least a 95% work approval rating.
The experiment took on average 3 minutes and participants were compensated $0.40 for
their work.
Procedure.
On each trial, participants were presented with prompts of the following form:
Imagine you come across a thing (animal or insect) that f. What do you
think it is?
Participants responded by filling in a text box with their response for twenty-one trials
in total, one for each property. No filler trials were used. Trials were presented in a
randomized order.
Free production data processing. To process the free production, we forced all
characters in a response to lower case, removed spaces, and made all terms into singular
terms (e.g., “lions” –> “lion”). As well, “mosquito” was a commonly misspelled label; we
counted anything that started with “mosqu”, “mesqu”, “misqu”, “mosiq” as “mosquito”.
To calculate confidence intervals for the free production data, we resampled
participants (with replacement) and computed the proportion of responses that were of the
target category (e.g., the proportion of “mosquito” responses for the cue “carries malaria”).
We did this 1000 times to generate an empirical distribution from which 95% intervals could
be calculated.
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Results and Evaluation
We are interested in the results of each measure (direct question and free production)
for the three conditions corresponding to the desiderata outlined above. To evaluate each
measure, we selected four example property–category pairs that we believe are unambiguous
instances of the boundary conditions described above (these items are described above with
the desiderata).
Figure 12A shows the results for the twelve items of interest for both measurements.
We see that for the false features, both measures behave as desired (hypothesized results
shown by the dotted line): The cue validity of a feature that is not present in the category is
zero or near-zero. For diagnostic features, both measures also behave reasonably: Learning
that an entity has malaria strongly implies that it is a mosquito. However, there is some
evidence that the free production measurement is more sensitive than the direct-question
measure. “Having a mane” is strongly diagnostic for a “lion” but also for a “horse” (and so
the overall cue validity of having a mane for a lion is around 0.5). “Carrying Lyme disease”
is mostly diagnostic for a “tick” but also “deer” (and thus, the cue validity for tick is not
maximal). These subtle differences among diagnostic features are picked up by the
free-production measure but not by the direct-question measure.
The free production and direct question measures deviate most strongly in their
characterization of the undiagnostic features. Learning that an entity is female should not
imply that it is a robin, which is accurately reflected in the free production measure but not
in the direct question measure. Figure 12B shows the raw empirical distributions of responses
for the direct question measure for undiagnositic features. We observe that participants
respond to this question for undiagnostic features in one of two ways: (i) reporting near-0
likelihood (hypothesized response) or (ii) reported near-0.5 likelihood. This latter response
option may reflect participants “opting out” of a response (e.g., signalling “I don’t know”).
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For example, in response to the question “There is a thing that is female. What are the odds
that it is a robin?”, a person could say they have no evidence to suggest that it is, besides
the very fact that the experimenter asked the question. Participants may cope with the
awkwardness of the question by placing the slider bar in the middle of the scale.
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Figure 12 . A: Empirically measured cue validity for two different tasks. Items are grouped by
whether the property is never present in the category (false), the property is always present
in the category and every other category (undiagnostic), or present in the category and
absent from most other categories (diagnostic). Dotted lines denote theoretical cue validity
representing the desiderata (see text). B: Raw empirical distributions for the undiagnostic
features in the direct question task. C: Correspondence between measured cue validity and
prevalence prior derived cue validity.
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Comparison with prevalence prior derived cue validity
To further understand these measures of cue validity, we compare them to cue validity
derived from our prevalence prior elicitation task (Expt. 1b). Expt. 1b is not perfectly
designed for this comparison, as we supplied participants with half of the animal categories
that they rated (the other half was freely generated by participants); including these
supplied categories was important to measure the referent-prevalence of interest (e.g., the
percentage of mosquitos that carry malaria). Including them in this analysis, however,
potentially distorts the prior probability of categories P (k).
In this analysis, we treat each category entry from Expt. 1b (participant free
production or experimentally supplied category like mosquitos) as contributing to the
prevalence prior. This results in the prevalence prior favoring kinds that are easy to produce
(like dogs and cats; plausibly a good approximation for P (k)) as well as favoring the
experimentally supplied kinds (like mosquitos and robins).
We compute cue validity from the prevalence prior using Bayes’ rule. Figure 12C shows
the two measurements of cue validity as they relate to the prevalence prior derived cue
validity. Across the thirty property–category pairs, the prevalence prior derived cue validity
is highly associated with both measurements: r2direct(30) = 0.782; MSEdirect = 0.0481 and
r2free(30) = 0.739; MSEfree = 0.0244. Of primary interest is how the measurements behave
for desiderata items. We see that the prevalence prior derived cue validity converges with the
free production measurement for the desiderata items (r2free(12) = 0.947;
MSEfree = 0.00822), whereas the direct question measurement overestimates the cue
validity of undiagnositic features (r2direct(12) = 0.779; MSEdirect = 0.0561).
The points of largest deviation for the free-production measurement from the
prevalence prior derived measurement occur where the prevalence prior derived measure
rates the cue validity as relatively high when the free-production measure gives the item low
THE LANGUAGE OF GENERALIZATION 109
cue validity (two black points in Figure 12C, high X-value, low Y-value). These two items
are: (“is red”, “cardinal”) and (“is white”, “swan”). These items should have relatively low
cue validity and are overestimated by the prevalence prior because of the prior on categories
P (k) over-represents the categories that were supplied to every participant and thus get a
higher weighting in the prior for deriving cue validity.27 In comparison, the direct question
measurement overestimates cue validity for almost all of the items relative to the cue validity
derived from the prevalence prior.
Summary
Cue validity is a commonly used measurement for understanding generic truth
judgments (e.g., Khemlani et al., 2012; Prasada et al., 2013). We observed different
measurements used in the literature and articulated three a priori desiderata to validate a
measure of cue validity. We found that the “free production” measurement (i.e., participants
freely produced categories given a feature), and not the direct question measurement (i.e.,
participants provide a likelihood judgment of a particular category given the feature),
satisfied all three boundary conditions. In addition, cue validity derived from our prevalence
prior measurement (Expt. 1b) also satisfied these boundary conditions. Researchers
interested in comparing cue validity to generic truth judgments should use a free production
paradigm for measuring cue validity.
27This deviation could be reduced in future experiments by performing a fully free production version of
the prevalence prior task (i.e., without supplying the referent categories).
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Appendix C: Bayesian Data Analysis
In our three case studies, we compare an information-theoretic, computational model
of endorsement to human endorsements of the language of generalization. The model has a
single free parameter: the optimality parameter λ in Eq. 3. We analyze this model using a
Bayesian data analytic approach, where we jointly infer the value of this single model
parameter λ together with parameters that govern the prevalence priors P (p) (Eq. 1) and
referent prevalence p (Eq. 3) for each item. To pin down the prevalence prior and referent
prevalence parameters, we use the data directly related to those parameters (e.g., prior
elicitation data). Incorporating all data sources into a single Bayesian data analysis model is
the appropriate way to track measurement uncertainty for all measurements simultaneously.
In this appendix, we describe this procedure in more detail for each case study.
Modeling prevalence priors
In Case Study 1: Generic Language (Expt. 1b), we elicited the prevalence prior by
asking participants about the prevalence of features for individual categories. We performed
an analogous elicitation in Case Study 3: Causal Language (Expt. 3a). We describe the
analysis using generics as our running example, but a parallel analysis was done for causal
language.
Participants’ responses in the prior elicitation task can be thought of as samples from
the prevalence prior distribution. Formally, we assume the prior data (analyzed
independently for each property) was generated from one of two underlying distributions: a
distribution corresponding to those kinds with a stable causal mechanism that could give rise
to the property (Dstable) and a “transient cause” distribution corresponding to those kinds
without a stable mechanism (Dtransient). The “transient” distribution intuitively corresponds
to categories that do not have the feature normally, but potentially could acquire the feature
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by accidental forces (e.g., a lion, who through some genetic mutation, reproduces by laying
eggs). We model this distribution as a Beta distribuition that heavily favors probabilities
near 0: Beta(γ = 0.01, δ = 100).28 The “stable” distribution is modeled as a Beta
distribution with unknown parameters Beta(γ, ξ).29 Finally, we assume that these two
components combine with mixture weighting φ such that the data we observe is
P (d) = φ · Beta(d | γ, ξ) + (1− φ) · Beta(d | γ = 0.01, ξ = 100)
. We put the following priors over the latent parameters of the model:
φi ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
γi ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
ξi ∼ Uniform(0, 100)
where i ranges over the different properties (e.g., lays eggs, carries malaria).
To learn about the credible values of the parameters, we ran separate MCMC chains
for each item, collecting 75,000 samples, removing the first 25,000 for burn-in. To see how
well the mixture model fits the prevalence prior data, we use the inferred parameters to
generate new data. The data generated from the model’s posterior is called the posterior
predictive distribution and is an important step in model criticism. If the model is a good
representation of the data, the posterior predictive data will align with the observed
28Note that we use the noncanonical mean γ and concentration ξ (or, inverse-variance) parameterization of
the Beta distribution rather than the canonical shape (or pseudocount) parameterization for ease of posterior
inference. The shape parameterization can be recovered using: α = γ · ξ;β = (1− γ) · ξ.
29Because the Beta distribution is not defined at the points 0 and 1, we add  to the 0 responses and round
1 to 0.99. Similar results can be obtained by rounding 0 to 0.01. Alternatively, the “transient” distribution
could be defined as a Delta distribution at 0, and 0 responses could remain in their raw form. Adjusting 1 to
1−  leads to improper inferences for this simple 2-component model, as 1−  is only likely under a highly
left-skewed distribution; treating 1 as 1−  disproportionately influences the shape of Dstable, forcing it to
favor probabilities close to 1. This problem does not appear for 0 being adjusted to  because the “transient”
distribution already expects such low values.
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experimental data. We construct a posterior predictive distribution by “forward sampling”
the model (i.e., generating new data given the inferred parameter values).30 Representative
posterior predictive results are shown in Figure 5B (main text).
In Case Study 2 on habitual language (Expt. 2a), we asked participants about
parameters of this mixture model (by having participants answer questions about different
kinds of people) rather than having participants give samples (e.g., by listing their friends
and family members, and rating how often they did certain actions). In pilot testing, we
found these different methodologies to give comparable results and we opted to ask about
hypothetical people to probe about potentially undesirable habits of participants’ friends and
familiy (e.g., how often they use cocaine). The questions used in this structured elicitation
task are described in the main text.
Modeling referent-prevalence
In Case Study 1 (generics), we used participants prevalence ratings for the
category-of-interest in our generic sentences as the referent-prevalence that is used in the
endorsement model (Eq. 3). For a given generic sentence (e.g., “Robins lay eggs”), we took
the prevalence ratings for the referent-category (e.g., the percentage of robins that lay eggs)
from the prior elicitation task (Expt. 1b) and assumed those were generated from a single
Beta distribution. We assumed the following priors on the parameters:
γi ∼ Uniform(0, 1)
ξi ∼ Uniform(0, 100)
30This forward sampling can be described by the following algorithm: First, flip a coin weighted by φ. If it
comes up heads, we then sample from the “stable” component: Beta(γ, ξ). If it comes up tails, we sample
from the “transient” component: Beta(0.01, 100). We do this many times using the posterior distibution to
generate a distribution over predicted prevalence ratings.
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We took samples from the posterior predictive of this Beta distribution (i.e., reconstructed
prevalence ratings) as the referent-prevalence used in the model.
In Expt. 2b (Habitual endorsement), we used the frequency given to participants in
the experimental prompt (e.g., 3 times in the past week) as the referent-prevalence. In Expt.
2c (“What is prevalence?”), we compared two endorsement models that differed in their
representation of referent-prevalence. For one model (past frequency model), the actual
frequency given to participants in the experimental prompt was assumed to be the referent
prevalence (same as in Expt. 2b); for the other model (predictive frequency model), we used
the mean elicited frequency from the predictive frequency condition (participants predictions
about how often the person would do the action in the next time interval; see main text for
details). In Case Study 3 (Causal endorsement), we used the proportion of successful causal
events given to participants in the experimental prompt (e.g., 70 out of 100 uses of Herb C
made animals sleepy).
Jointly modeling referent-prevalence, prevalence priors, and generic
endorsements
To fit the generic endorsement models, we incorporate them into the Bayesian data
analytic model of the prevalence prior data (described above) to create a single,
joint-inference model where the optimality parameter λ (Eq. 3) is inferred jointly with all
the other latent parameters of the full model (the referent-prevalence p for each category k
and property f and the parameters of the prevalence priors P (p) for each property f) using
data from Expt. 1a & b (Figure 13). For the parameters of the prevalence priors, we use the
same priors described in Expt. 1b; for the speaker optimality parameter, we use a prior with
a range consistent with the previous literature that uses the same model class:
λ ∼ Uniform(0, 5). We learn about the a posteriori credible values of the joint inference
models by collecting samples from 3 MCMC chains of 150,000 iterations removing the first
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50,000 iterations for burn-in, using an incrementalized version of the Metropolis-Hastings
algorithm (Ritchie et al., 2016). This algorithm is useful for models with many variables that
only affect a subset of the full model’s predictions (e.g., models with by-item or
by-participant parameters, wherein those additional parameters mostly only influence
predictions for those items or participants).
Supplementary model criticism
In addition to examining the posterior predictive distribution on endorsement
judgments (presented in main text), we examined the marginal posteriors on parameters of
the prevalence priors and referent-prevalence. These marginal distributions are important to
confirm that they have not changed substantially from the parameters inferred from their
primary data sources in isolation. For example, when modeling the referent-prevalence data
in isolation, the model infers that roughly 65% of robins lay eggs, as that is what
participants on average produce in the prevalence elicitation task.31 If the joint inference
model (which models all data sources—referent prevalence, prevalence prior, and generic
endorsement—simultaneously) infers referent-prevalence values substantially different from
those inferred by a model of referent prevalence in isolation, that would suggest that the
joint-model is distorting the prevalence parameters to accommodate the endorsement data.
Such a result would call into question the inferences we as scientists derive from the joint
inference model. For example, incorporating a linear regression model (of the kind presented
as alterantive models in the main text) into this Bayesian joint-inference analysis model
produces posterior predictions that match the generic endorsement data surprisingly well
(e.g., that model predicts “Robins lay eggs” is true). Such a model is only able to do this,
however, by distorting the referent-prevalence data, inferring that 100% of robins lay eggs;
thus, the linear model in this joint-inference analysis framework sacrifices its goodness-of-fit
31Most participants report that 50% of robins lay eggs, while a minority respond 100%.
THE LANGUAGE OF GENERALIZATION 115
to the referent-prevalence data in order to increase its goodness-of-fit to the endorsement
data.32 Such a distortion manifests as a difference between the inferred parameters given only
the referent-prevalence data and given the full joint model (all data sources simultaneously).
To investigate this distortion effect in the parameters, we compare the values inferred
for the parameters governing the prevalence priors and referent prevalence variables before
and after the joint-inference model sees the generic endorsement data. Specifically, we infer
the parameters for prevalence priors and referent prevalence by constructing single models of
these tasks and compare the inferred values to those that result from the joint-inference
model. The inferred parameters for these two models are shown in Figure 14. We found that
the referent-prevalences and prevalence priors inferred under the joint model were almost
indistinguishable from those inferred using only the referent-prevalence and prevalence prior
data, respectively (numerical results reported in main text). This results confirms that
modeling all three data sources simultaneously does not distort some data sources (e.g.,
referent prevalence) in order to provide good fits for others (e.g., generic endorsement).
32This distortion effect is why we accout for measurement uncertainty in the linear models by bootstrapping
the data that forms their predictors, rather than performing a Bayesian analysis.
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Appendix D: Habituals Items
habitual referent frequency enabling preventative
climbs mountains 5 years*, 2 years, year Yesterday, William remem-
bered how much fun that was
bought a lot of new mountain
climbing gear.
Yesterday, William turned 80
and gave up all strenuous phys-
ical exercise because his doctor
said it would be deadly.
does cocaine 5 years, year*,
month, week
Yesterday, Tim wanted to get
high and bought some cocaine.
Yesterday, William realized he
is severely allergic to cocaine
and will no longer do it.
drinks beer year, month*, 2
weeks, week
Yesterday, Tim wanted to get
tipsy and bought a six-pack of
beer.
Yesterday, William gave up al-
cohol and entered into Alco-
holics Anonymous.
drinks coffee year, month*, 2
weeks, week
Yesterday, William wanted a
morning jolt and bought a
pound of fresh roasted coffee.
Yesterday, Veronica developed
a caffeine allergy and decided to
give up all caffeine.
eats caviar 5 years*, year, month Yesterday, William learned
about the dietary benefits of
eating caviar and bought a jar
at the supermaket.
Yesterday, Tina developed a
seafood allergy.
eats peanut but-
ter
5 years, year*, month Yesterday, Veronica learned
about the dietary benefits
of eating peanut butter and
bought a jar at the supermaket.
Yesterday, Ted developed a
peanut allergy.
goes to the ballet 2 years, year, month
goes to the movies 2 years, year, month
hikes 2 years, year*, 2
months, week
Yesterday, William remem-
bered how much fun those
times were and bought a lot of
new hiking gear.
Yesterday, Vince was in a mo-
torcycle accident and will never
walk again.
listens to live mu-
sic
year, month, week
listens to Pandora year, month, week
plays tennis 5 years, 2 years, year* Yesterday, Tim remembered
how much fun that was and
bought a new tennis racket.
Yesterday, William developed
crippling arthritis in both el-
bows and can only move his
arms extremely slowly.
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plays the banjo 5 years, 2 years, year* Yesterday, William re-
membered how much fun
that was and joined his
friend&quotechars band as the
banjoist.
Yesterday, William developed
crippling arthritis in his hands
and no longer can play musical
instruments.
runs 2 years, year, 2
months*, week
Yesterday, Vince remembered
how much fun those times were
and bought a new pair of run-
ning shoes.
Yesterday, Veronica was in a
car accident and became per-
manently paralyzed from the
waist down.
sells companies 5 years, year
sells things on
eBay
5 years, year
smokes cigarettes year, month*, week Yesterday, Tina wanted a
smoke and bought a pack of
cigarettes.
Yesterday, Vince quit smoking
cigarettes.
smokes marijuana 5 years, year*,
month, week
Yesterday, William wanted to
get high and bought some mar-
ijuana.
Yesterday, Vince realized he is
severely allergic to marijuana
and will no longer smoke it.
steals cars 5 years*, year, month Yesterday, William learned a
new technique for breaking into
cars.
Yesterday, Tina got caught and
went through a radical transfor-
mation, vowing to never break
the law again.
steals chewing
gum
5 years*, year, month Yesterday, Vince learned a new
trick to distract shopkeepers.
Yesterday, William got caught
and vowed to never break the
law again.
volunteers for po-
litical campaigns
5 years*, year Yesterday, Vince researched a
new political candidate in the
area and is going to volunteer
with them.
Yesterday, Vince grew disillu-
sioned with the political system
and wants nothing to do with it
anymore.
volunteers for
soup kitchens
5 years*, year Yesterday, Vince researched a
new soup kitchen in the area
and is going to volunteer with
them.
Yesterday, Tom grew disillu-
sioned with the soup kitchen
system and wants nothing to do
with it anymore.
watches profes-
sional football
2 years, year*, month Yesterday, William remem-
bered how much enjoyable that
was and upgraded his cable to
have access to all professional
football games.
Yesterday, Veronica learned
about all the corruption in pro-
fessional sports and no longer
can watch it.
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watches space
launches
2 years*, year, month Yesterday, William remem-
bered how much enjoyable that
was and researched all of the
space launches in the next year
within driving distance.
Yesterday, William went
through a radical transfor-
mation and now it is against
his belief to witness anything
relating to space travel.
wears a bra 6 months, month,
week
wears a suit 6 months, month*,
week
Yesterday, Vince got a high
paying job on Wall Street.
Yesterday, Veronica got fired
from her job on Wall Street and
now works in a pizza parlor.
wears a watch 6 months, month,
week
wears slacks 6 months, month,
week
wears socks 6 months, month,
week
writes novels 5 years*, year Yesterday, William finished an
MFA program and quit his
other job to focus on writing
novels.
Yesterday, William became fed
up with the literary world and
decided to never write anything
again.
writes poems 5 years, year* Yesterday, William finished an
MFA program and quit his
other job to focus on writing
poems.
Yesterday, Veronica became fed
up with the poetry world and
decided to never write poems
again.
Items used in Case Study 2 (Habitual language). Referent frequency denotes the
experimentally supplied time periods during which a person did an action 3 times (e.g., “In
the past 5 years, John climbed mountains three times.”; Expt. 2b). Enabling and
preventative columns provide the causal manipulation sentences used in Expt. 2c in order to
enable or prevent future instances of the action (blank entries indicate that the item was not
used in Expt. 2c). Referent frequency with an asterisk denotes the time interval used in
Expt. 2c.
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Figure 13 . Quasi-graphical model corresponding to the fully Bayesian data analysis of the
endorsement model for Case Study 1 (generic language). The prevalence prior data dprf is
assumed to be generated from the mixture model validated in Expt. 1a, which has three
parameters: mean of the stable-cause distribution γf and concentration (inverse-variance)
of the stable-cause distribution ξf and the mixture parameter φf . The referent-prevalence
dprk,f is generated from a Beta distribution with paramters: mean γk,f and concentration
(inverse-variance) ξk, f . The posterior predictives of the prevalence prior P (pfk′) and the
referent prevalence pfk are then fed into the RSA speaker model S, which predicts the generic
endorsement data dendk,f . The speaker model S also takes in the single free parameter λ which
operates as a soft-max function. This overall structured is repeated (except λ) for each of the
unique properties f and categories k that correspond to the generic sentences in our stimulus
set. Note that S corresponds to a probabilistic function and not a random variable that is
standard in graphical model notation; S cannot be represented by a graphical model because
it has recursion. This entire BDA model is duplicated for the lesioned, fixed-threshold model
(which only differs in the definition of S). The BDA model for habituals and causals mirrors
this one, except they do not infer a referent prevalence pfk (they are assumed to be the same
as those experimentally supplied to participants).
THE LANGUAGE OF GENERALIZATION 120
mixture parameter (φ) stable component
mean (γ)
stable component
concentration (ξ)
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0 20 40 60
0
20
40
60
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
Prevalence prior model parametersJ
oi
nt
−i
nf
e
re
n
ce
 m
o
de
l p
ar
a
m
e
te
rs
A referent prevalence
 mean (γ)
referent prevalence
concentration (ξ)
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 0 25 50 75 100
0
25
50
75
100
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
Referent prevalence model parameters
B
Figure 14 . No evidence for parameter distortion caused by a joint-inference model. X-axis
denotes Maximum A-Posteriori (MAP) estimates inferred using only a single data source (A:
Prevalence prior data. B: Referent prevalence data). Y-axis denotes MAP estimates inferred
using the joint-inference model which models all data sources simultaneously. Distortions
would manifest by systematic deviations from the y=x line.
